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Executive Summary

O

n June 7, 2011, on a stretch of North
Carolina highway between Raleigh and
Durham, Jesús Martínez Benitez, 32,
and Luis Castaneda Gómez, 34, were working on installation of new water mains. The two
worked alone at their assigned task: descending
into an underground bunker that housed valves
critical to the water lines’ operation. When coworkers came to pick up Benitez and Gómez,
they found the men slumped inside the four-bysix foot bunker, 12 feet below ground. Both had
died of asphyxiation, most likely the result of one
of the men passing out in the low-oxygen enclosed space and the other making the fatal decision to rush to save him without adequate protection. The company that employed Benitez and
Gómez had a history of violating occupational
health and safety (OHS) laws, including failing to
train workers on how to avoid unsafe conditions.
Sadly, the men’s deaths, like thousands of others
every year, were completely preventable.
Cold comfort though it may be to their families,
friends, and co-workers, Benitez’s and Gómez’s
deaths helped advocates propel a new ordinance through the Durham City Council that
requires potential contractors to answer detailed
questions about their compliance records and
safety plans. The ordinance will help ensure that
future contracts do not go to companies that
disregard their duties to protect workers.
Such reforms are emblematic of the progress
that can be made at the state and local level
when workers and their advocates are prepared
to offer practical solutions and policymakers are
ready to act. In this manual, we outline nearly
two dozen proposals for state and local policy
reform that would empower workers, fix OHS
laws, and strengthen the agencies that strive to
promote workplace safety. Some proposals are
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simple to understand and self-contained, that is,
they focus narrowly on problems with OHS laws
or agencies. For example, beginning on page
35, we describe how the fines for violating OHS
laws are too weak to provide strong deterrent
effects and should be strengthened so that the
punishment not only fits the crime but also induces other employers to be more conscientious
about their OHS-related responsibilities.
Other proposals in these pages are more
ambitious, addressing serious problems with
solutions that would fundamentally change the
relationship between workers, employers, and
government enforcement agencies. For example, giving workers the right to sue their employers for violating OHS standards (discussed at p.
27) and establishing corporate manslaughter
laws (see p. 42) are policies that might only be
adopted by truly progressive state legislatures
under pressure from workers and a strong coalition of allies.
We present this broad range of proposals so
that workers and their advocates have a full
menu of ideas to consider. The manual is divided into three main chapters and 14 individual
sections, each addressing a particular problem
and outlining progressive solutions to that problem. The individual solutions are designed to
stand on their own so that workers and their advocates can refer to individual sections without
having to read the manual cover to cover.
In Chapter 1, we focus on empowering workers, addressing five topics: health and safety
committees that effectively involve workers in
preventing occupational injuries and illnesses;
education and training designed to provide
workers a knowledge base for action; improved
protections for whistleblowers; the right to refuse
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unsafe work; and statutes that would give workers and their advocates the power to sue employers for failure to abide by OHS standards
and regulations.
In Chapter 2, we turn our attention to making
sure that companies tempted to cut corners
on worker safety know that they can expect to
pay a high price for doing so. We identify ways
to strengthen the criminal and civil penalties
imposed on employers that do not comply with
OHS standards, reform laws so that employers
must correct dangerous conditions as soon as
they receive citations from OHS inspectors, and
utilize government statistics to engage in “shaming” campaigns against scofflaw employers.
In Chapter 3, we set our sights on the government agencies that can promote improved
occupational health and safety. In addition to
suggesting improved oversight of OHS agencies
and better procedures for investigating occupational fatalities, we address how other agencies could bolster the work of officials who are
directly empowered by OHS laws. Government

Executive Summary

contracting and procurement decisions, for
instance, should take better account of bidders’
OHS programs. Code-enforcement agencies,
like fire marshals and building inspectors, could
partner with OHS agencies to expand oversight.
We encourage workers and their advocates to
use this manual as a starting point for discussions about how the ideas presented here correlate to their individual and organizational goals.
We focus on changes to laws and policies that
are designed to prevent occupational injuries
and illnesses, not the safety nets available to
workers after they are hurt (e.g., workers’ compensation, tort law, and disability insurance).
Those safety nets are important, but space and
resource constraints prevent us from addressing
them here. This manual also does not address
organizing strategies, research and resource
needs, partnership opportunities, or other issues necessary for successful campaigns, since
those issues depend on local factors. Such work
is vital, but we focus here on the ideas around
which such campaigns might be built.
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Introduction

D

espite notable improvements in occupational health and safety over the last few
decades, far too many workers still suffer
on-the-job injuries and illnesses that could have
been prevented. Four to five thousand workers
die on the job each year, an average of more
than 10 every day. The number of workers who
suffer occupational injuries or illnesses each
year is hundreds of times the number who die
on the job.1 The sad truth is that the people who
bear the brunt of unsafe working conditions
are increasingly the working poor, immigrants,
and others struggling simply to put food on the
table and keep a roof overhead. These victims
and their equally at-risk co-workers have both
a real and a perceived lack of power in relation to their employers, leaving them unable
to demand the engineering controls, improved
work practices, and other actions that employers
should take to eliminate occupational hazards.
That is precisely why strong laws and regulations are so critical. Workers’ advocates—
unions, local worker centers, legal aid organizations, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and a variety of other
public interest groups—are a powerful force
for stronger safeguards, as evidenced by many
hard-fought victories over the years.
Chief among those victories was passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
of 1970. A watershed achievement, the OSH
Act established the basic structure of today’s
occupational health and safety (OHS) regulatory
system: The federal Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (Fed-OSHA) has the power to write health and safety standards and to
enforce them through unannounced workplace
inspections and a graduated system of civil and
criminal penalties; employers can challenge alleged violations through an administrative pro-
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cess overseen by the independent Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission; and,
critically, individual states can opt to establish
their own OHS agencies that take the place of
Fed-OSHA so long as the “state-plan” agency
is at least as effective as Fed-OSHA in carrying
out Congress’s mandate to “assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”2
The OSH Act also preserved individual states’
workers’ compensation programs. In the
early part of the 20th century, state legislatures
throughout the United States enacted new laws
that limited workers’ right to sue their employers following an on-the-job injury or the onset
of an occupational illness. With limited access
to the courts, workers instead file claims for
compensation, which are resolved through an
administrative process. Critically, workers do not
need to prove that an employer was at fault to
obtain compensation, so the workers’ compensation system is—theoretically—a simpler route
to recovering the costs of occupational injuries
and illnesses than was the process of suing an
employer in court. For employers, the workers’ compensation system provides some level
of cost control and predictability, since workers’ compensation payments are disbursed by
insurance providers rather than the employer.
The OSH Act was designed to complement the
workers’ compensation system—OHS standards
should prevent many occupational injuries
and illnesses, while the workers’ compensation
system should provide medical care and financial compensation when workers are injured. In
practice, some injured workers receive prompt
and adequate compensation, while others face
substantial hurdles and may never receive the
compensation they should get (see the Appendix
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for more on shortcomings in the workers’ compensation system).
The OSH Act, as implemented by Fed-OSHA
and its state-plan partners, has succeeded in
reducing overall injury and illness rates significantly over the last 45 years. But the Act is imperfect, the agencies struggle to fulfill their mission with insufficient resources, and workers still
face substantial OHS risks. By some measures,
we have hit a plateau in our collective efforts to
ensure safe and healthful working conditions for
all. This is not because workplace health and
safety is an unachievable goal. Rather, the better explanation is that our current OHS system
needs reforms to address the changing nature
of work in the United States and the changing
role of government in our lives.
One of the most significant economic trends affecting workers’ health and safety is the increas-
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ing mobility of the workforce. It has become
rare for a worker to spend an entire career
with a single company, and transient workers
have less bargaining power than long-term
employees. In fact, such major retail companies as Walmart and Amazon employ hundreds
of thousands of workers through their supply
chains but rely increasingly on staffing agencies
to fill their labor needs—a strategy that allows
them to change the size of their workforce on a
day-to-day basis, while also passing the buck
on OHS and workers’ compensation responsibilities. Changes to the way government works
have also slowed progress toward safer workplaces. The federal rulemaking process is so
ossified, so paralyzed, that Fed-OSHA is, for
all intents and purposes, unable to begin work
on even a single new standard and finalize that
standard within any one presidential administration.
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The good news is that workers’ advocates at the
state and local levels are mounting successful
worker safety campaigns on a regular basis. In
recent years, at the urging of advocates, state
and local governments have tackled a wide
range of issues, including the following:
•	After two workers died while working inside
a manhole on a city-funded job with a company that had racked up dozens of health
and safety citations, Durham, North Carolina
adopted a new policy for choosing companies
to complete city projects. Companies bidding
for the contracts are now required to provide
information on their safety and health programs, injury data, and workers’ compensation rates.
• In response to temporary workers encountering problems getting payment or workers’
compensation from temporary staffing agencies, Massachusetts passed the Temporary
Workers Right to Know Act. Now, staffing
agencies must provide workers with written information about their job assignments, health
and safety training requirements, protective
equipment that should be available, wages,
and information about the staffing agency
and its workers’ compensation carrier.
•	Following a newspaper series on cancerstricken health care workers and a campaign
by health care workers and other advocates,
Washington State adopted a regulation to
protect health care workers from exposure to
chemotherapy agents and other hazardous
drugs. Employers whose workers may be exposed to such drugs (e.g., through touching,
breathing, or needle sticks) are now required
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to develop control programs with procedures
for the drugs’ storage, use, and disposal.
• Waste recycling workers face a multitude of
health and safety hazards. Some have been
fatally injured. In California, Worksafe, the International Longshore Warehouse Union, the
East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy,
and other allies pressured municipalities to
require that new franchise agreements with
waste collection and recycling companies include provisions ensuring these workers earn
decent wages and benefits and are protected
from dangerous working conditions. Accordingly, Oakland and Fremont city councils
passed resolutions in early 2014 that direct
their city managers to address these issues
when negotiating contracts.
These groups and their counterparts in other
cities and states throughout the country have
the opportunity to transform OHS policies in
ways that, largely for political reasons, have not
worked at the national level. In doing so, they
may provide the momentum that is needed to
push Congress and others to establish better
protections for all workers. National right-toknow laws, which promote better understanding of chemical hazards in the workplace, for
instance, came to be adopted only after workers
and their allies succeeded in passing similar
laws at the state and local levels in the 1970s
and early 1980s. The proposals described in the
pages that follow could be a starting point for
discussions among workers and their advocates
about the next generation of OHS reforms. Success at the local and state levels could again lay
the groundwork for national reform.
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How to Use This Manual

T

his manual is intended for workers’ advocates who want to press their state legislators, state agencies, and local officials to
adopt laws and policies that will better protect
workers from occupational health and safety
hazards. Each section of the manual has four
principle pieces: a description of a problem, a
proposed solution or interrelated set of solutions, notes on challenges related to the proposed solutions, and some useful examples. We
cite some examples of national-scale efforts to
reform the OSH Act or Fed-OSHA policies, but
these references are intended only to provide
guidance on the substance of the proposals.
Given the deadlock in the U.S. Congress and
the slow pace of action at Fed-OSHA, this manual proceeds from the premise that for now,
state and local advocacy is the best approach to
testing the solutions outlined below.
The manual outlines a menu of ideas from
which state and local advocates might choose
issues around which to build campaigns. We
have steered away from ideas centered on
particular hazards, focusing instead on crosscutting issues designed to empower workers,
eliminate the economic benefits of ignoring the
law, and strengthen the institutions that enforce
the law. We have also limited our discussion
of workers’ compensation, tort law, disability
benefits, and other “safety net” programs that
provide benefits to workers who have suffered
occupational injuries or illnesses. Other individuals and organizations in the community have
applied their expertise to such topics; our main
focus here is on laws and standards that will
prevent tragedies in the workplace.

We want to emphasize that this manual is
merely a starting point for collaborative discussions about improving OHS conditions. Our
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hope is that organizations operating at the state
and local levels will use the manual to prompt
discussions among worker-members and client
groups about their most significant OHS concerns. So we present a broad array of ideas,
some more readily achievable than others, but
all with the potential to transform the way workers, the public, and lawmakers approach the
issue of occupational health and safety.
The manual does not discuss organizing strategies, research and resource needs, partnership
opportunities, or other issues that undergird
successful campaigns. Local conditions dictate
how best to achieve campaign goals, so discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of this
document. Again, others in the community have
greater expertise on organizing strategies; we
stick to policies in these pages.
Recognizing the vibrant community of workers’
advocates who have achieved success in many
arenas but may be new to the world of FedOSHA and state-plan OHS agencies, we have
included a short overview of the OSH Act and
workers’ compensation at the end of the document. It begins on page 74.
Advocates who are interested in campaigning
for any of the reforms discussed in this manual
should prepare for employers to argue that federal law “preempts” new state laws or regulations. While a detailed discussion of preemption
is beyond the scope of this manual, we provide
a brief overview and note special preemptionrelated issues at appropriate points in the
recommendation sections below. We urge advocates to consult with an expert on the preemption issue as they prepare to campaign for any
of the solutions recommended in this manual.
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In general, state-plan states have substantial leeway to expand upon the minimum OHS requirements set by Fed-OSHA, while states covered by
Fed-OSHA are more constrained. These principles are derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
1992 Gade (pronounced “Gay-dee”) decision,
in which the Court ruled that if Fed-OSHA has issued a standard covering a particular OHS issue,
only state-plan states may establish their own
standards on that issue. Legislators in states under Fed-OSHA’s jurisdiction are therefore limited
to writing laws that address issues not covered by
a Fed-OSHA standard. The Supreme Court also
left open the possibility that “laws of general applicability,” which are aimed at enhancing public
safety (not just worker safety) and only regulate
employers insofar as they are members of the
general public, may not be preempted by FedOSHA standards.

To help clarify where preemption is a significant
hurdle, we have included symbols at the beginning of each “Solution” section of the manual.
The solid map of the United States
icon indicates that the proposed
solution is possible in both stateplan states and states within FedOSHA’s jurisdiction.
The green map of the United
States icon indicates that the proposed solution is only possible in
state-plan states.
See the Appendix, at p.74, for a more detailed
description of Fed-OSHA and state-plan jurisdiction

Occupational Health and Safety Jurisdiction

Fed-OSHA
State-plan state
State-plan for public sector only

8

Winning Safer Workplaces: A Manual for State and Local Policy Reform

Chapter 1: Empowering Workers

E

xperience shows that when workers are
empowered—when they act collectively
to influence working conditions—positive
change is eminently possible. To truly empower
workers would require revolutionary changes
to the labor market, political institutions, and
the social safety net. But within the boundaries
of occupational health and safety (OHS) law
and policy, workers’ advocates can campaign
for targeted reforms that give workers more
power with respect to individual employers—
an important step in long-term organizing
efforts. In this section, we describe health and
safety committees, expanded OHS education
and training requirements, stronger whistleblower protections, and “citizen suits” as promising campaign issues that hold the potential
to generate real power for workers to demand
changes from their employers.
The reforms in this section are designed to
empower workers to act without having to rely
on state or federal OHS agencies. The federal
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (Fed-OSHA’s) total budget and the
pass-through funds that go to support state-

plan OHS agencies have never been sufficient
to protect workers and have failed to keep up
with inflation and changes in the workplace,
preventing Fed-OSHA and state-plan OHS
agencies from maintaining an inspection workforce that keeps pace with the growing U.S.
economy. The most striking way to illustrate
how this resource shrinkage has played out is
to look at how the ratio of OHS inspectors to
workers has changed over time.3 In the late
1970s, Fed-OSHA had about 15 inspectors
per 1 million workers, and even that was not
enough to adequately enforce the law. Today,
that number has dwindled to about seven
inspectors per 1 million workers. These inspectors are hardworking and dedicated to protecting workers, but there are simply too few
of them to be the main bulwark against employers who create dangerous working conditions. Furthermore, government-created OHS
standards are a floor upon which to build, not
a ceiling intended to inhibit protections. Workers can demand additional protections if they
are empowered. The reforms outlined in this
section will give more workers the power to
demand the protections they deserve.

Fed-OSHA Compliance Officers per 1 Million Workers (1973–2013)
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Health and Safety Committees: Involving
Workers in Prevention
Problem
Inadequate protection for workers against employer retaliation, incomplete training on workplace hazards, difficulty stopping dangerous
work, and myriad other problems that prevent
workers from having safe and healthful work
can all be linked to the large power disparity between workers and their employers. That
power imbalance is related to the “representation/participation gap”—that is, the difference
between the worker-management relationship
that workers want and the relationship that they
actually experience.4 One measure of the gap
is the oft-cited decline in private-sector union
participation, which has dropped from a high
of about one-third of the private workforce
in 1950 to less than 10 percent today. Some
employers have experimented with different
forms of non-union employee representation
(e.g., Volkswagen’s “works councils”), but their
mandates vary and OHS issues are not always a
focal point.

Solution
Joint labor-management health
and safety committees can give
workers a stronger voice in the
OHS policies at their workplaces.
State legislatures can adopt legislation—some
have already—requiring employers to establish
health and safety committees. Such legislation
is possible in both state-plan states and states
covered by Fed-OSHA. Even without legislation,
committees can be established through a union
contract or by collective action of a group of
workers.
The basic concept of a health and safety
committee is simple: A select group of non-

10

management workers at each worksite sits on
a formal committee, alongside an equal or
lesser number of management-selected representatives. Committee members meet regularly
to discuss health and safety issues, including
hazards related to equipment and chemicals,
the effect of pace and duration of work on
health and safety, and the workers’ education
and training needs. Committee members might
conduct regular inspections or safety audits,
review “close calls” (when injusties and fatalities are narrowly avoided) and incident reports,
or accompany OHS agency officials during an
inspection. Effective committees play an important role in ensuring that hazards are identified
and corrected through these activities, as well
as by making formal recommendations on work
practices and engineering controls. Committees
can also help implement whistleblower protections and workers’ rights to refuse dangerous
work, as discussed below.
Health and safety committees hold great promise as a tool for giving workers more power
over their working conditions. Worker involve-
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ment in health and safety policy decisions builds
on workers’ expertise and knowledge and
promotes localized, worksite-based problem
solving. When the committees identify hazards
and use their authority to pressure employers to fix problems, they have the potential to
make health and safety improvements faster
than could be achieved by filing a complaint to
the relevant OHS agency and waiting for the
inspection and appeals process to play out. And
committees can protect whistleblowers by making abatement recommendations or filing OHS
complaints on their behalf and thereby shielding them from managers who might retaliate.
State legislation can set forth critical aspects of
health and safety committees, including:

n A size trigger
State laws on health and safety committees
can establish a trigger that determines when a
committee is required, based on the number of
employees (e.g., committees are required for all
employers with more than 5, 10, or 25 employees). The smaller the trigger the better, since
there is evidence that, especially in high-hazard
industries, small firms have worse safety records
than larger firms.

n Structure
The size of the committee and its makeup can
be flexible, within limits—employer representatives must never outnumber worker representatives, and, for large worksites, the number of
worker representatives should be proportional
to the number of workers (e.g., one worker
representative for every 100 employees at a
worksite with 500 or more employees).

n Membership
Worker representatives should be elected by
workers for set terms, with the ability to serve
multiple terms. At unionized worksites, worker
representatives should be selected by the
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workers’ bargaining representative or union.
Contingent or temporary workers have unique
concerns that should be represented in the committee’s membership, perhaps through a position on the committee reserved for a contingent
or temporary worker (who would be elected
by other contingent workers). The chairperson
for the committee should alternate between a
management representative and a labor representative.

n Compensation
Worker representatives should be paid their
normal wages (including overtime, if appropriate) for time spent on committee duties.

n Locations
Employers with multiple locations should have
a committee at each location. Exceptions may
be appropriate for construction companies,
trucking companies, or other firms that can be
adequately served by a centralized committee.

n Frequency and conduct of meetings
Committee meetings should happen on a fixed
schedule (e.g., monthly). Effective committees
establish their own rules governing how agendas will be set, who will chair meetings, and
how the minutes will be recorded.

n Duties and functions
The most important work for health and safety
committees occurs outside of the regular meetings. Committees should develop policies and
practices that encourage workers to identify
and report hazards and ensure that employers
do not have programs in place that discourage
employees from reporting hazards or injuries.
They should also ensure strong whistleblower
protections and effective policies on the right
to refuse dangerous work. Committees should
develop worksite-specific training requirements
and tap the worker representatives on the com-
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mittee to act as peer trainers, delivering the
worksite-specific training to their co-workers.
To aid in the development of good training
programs, the employer should pay for annual
health and safety training for all worker representatives on the committees. Health and safety
committees should conduct investigations of
incidents that led to injuries or fatalities, and act
as a clearinghouse where workers can report
“close call” incidents. The committee should
investigate the incidents and make recommendations for preventing similar incidents in the
future.

n Enforcement
OHS agencies must have the power to cite employers that fail to ensure compliance with committee composition, activity, and recordkeeping
requirements. This enforcement authority is
critical to preventing “paper tiger” committees
that do little to help workers.

n Recommendations

Many states have adopted statutes that require
employers to develop health and safety committees or create financial incentives for doing so.
Often, these requirements are tied to workers’
compensation programs, since committees can
be an effective way to reduce OHS risks, which
in turn reduces workers’ compensation costs.

Committees (and individual committee members) should have the power to issue recommendations to the employer on ways to correct
hazards.

Most state legislatures have a recurring process
in which they consider reforms to their workers’ compensation programs on a biennial or
some other regular basis. In recent years, much

Health and Safety Committee Requirements

Mandatory requirement
Voluntary or public-sector only
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to the chagrin of workers and their advocates,
these review cycles have tended to focus on
cutting benefits and otherwise limiting workers’
compensation programs instead of strengthening them. Health and safety committee requirements have been a bright spot for workers,
though. Many legislatures have included committee requirements in their workers’ compensation reform efforts either as a concession to
workers who are losing on other aspects of the
legislation, or as a way to cut costs and create a
more “business friendly” climate in their state.

Challenges
The most serious issue standing in the way of
health and safety committees is the potential
conflict with the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). Written improperly, a state law requiring
health and safety committees might demand a
committee structure or set of duties that conflict
with the NLRA, thereby invalidating the law. Advocates who are considering pursuing a campaign to establish health and safety committees
should consult with an NLRA expert.
Briefly, the issue is that the NLRA prohibits
employers from interfering with or dominating
labor organizations. A joint labor-management
committee is likely to be considered a “labor
organization” under the NLRA if it has members who are elected by workers to deal with an
issue—health and safety—that is a mandatory
topic of bargaining under U.S. labor law. The
NLRA’s prohibition on employers interfering
with or dominating labor organizations would
prevent an employer from contributing financial or other support to the committee. That
would mean the committee could not meet on
company property and workers’ representatives
could not be paid for time spent on committee
functions. Practically speaking, there is no way
the committee could function effectively. The
relevant provision of the NLRA, section 8(a)(2),
was intended to stop employers from forming
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“company unions,” a tactic employed in the
early part of the 20th century to disrupt union
organizing. But because of the broad language
of the NLRA, modern-day programs intended
to give workers more power over their working
conditions can run afoul of the law. A full discussion of the relevant law is beyond the scope
of this document, but the key takeaway is that
there are ways to work around the NLRA problem. It is possible to structure the committees
and their powers in a way that ensures management does not dominate or interfere with
the committee’s work, thereby securing compliance with the NLRA. As outlined below, 23
states require or encourage the establishment of
health and safety committees. Labor law experts
can help workers’ advocates design state legislation in a way that ensures compliance with the
NLRA, while accomplishing the goal of requiring health and safety committees.
When Congress considered amending the OSH
Act in the early 1990s to include a requirement
that all employers with more than ten employees establish health and safety committees,
trade associations and their member companies
objected on other grounds.5 As with any proposal designed to benefit workers, employers
raised concerns about costs. But they came up
with inflated numbers that were hard to reconcile with cost analyses produced by Fed-OSHA
and state agencies that had recently established
health and safety committee mandates. Employers also argued that they should have the
flexibility to decide whether to establish a health
and safety committee, not a mandate. However,
employers are unlikely to establish voluntarily
the committee structures, policies, and procedures that ensure meaningful worker involvement and effective committees. A formal study
conducted for the Department of Labor concluded that voluntary committees often amount
to little more than “paper tigers.”6 And a more
recent study of health and safety committees
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established under Pennsylvania’s voluntary
program found that too much flexibility can lead
to ineffective committees.7 Nonetheless, some
flexibility can be written into the law by giving
employers the opportunity to seek variances
from the law’s requirements upon a showing
that their programs are at least as effective as
the statute’s requirements. (Legislation based on
a strict mandate also helps minimize the NLRA
problem because an employer is less likely to be
found to illegally “dominate” a committee when
the employer did not voluntarily create it.)

Examples
Mine workers bargained to establish the first
joint labor-management committees with a
health and safety aspect to their work over a
century ago. Since then, thousands of companies in many different industries have voluntarily
created such committees, labor unions have

bargained for their establishment in many contracts, and 23 states have adopted some form
of law or policy that encourages their formation. In the early 1990s, members of the U.S.
Congress introduced two bills that would have
amended the OSH Act to require employers
with 11 or more employees to form health and
safety committees.8 The bills provide a useful
example of legislative language that sets the
basic parameters for health and safety committees that would be effective and would fit within
the constraints of the NLRA.
Advocates might also find successful models for
health and safety committees where they were
created without a statutory mandate but are
overseen by OHS experts. For instance, many
collective bargaining agreements have health
and safety committee requirements that were
designed by unions’ OHS experts.

Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems
In this manual, we present recommendations about health and safety committees separately
from recommendations about improved education and training, but the two issues are closely
related. In many workplaces, both effective joint labor-management health and safety committees and job-specific training programs are part of a comprehensive occupational health
and safety management system, sometimes referred to as an injury and illness prevention
program (I2P2).
Occupational health and safety management systems vary in design, but the most effective
systems share a core set of features that include management leadership, employee participation, planning, implementation and operation, evaluation and corrective action, and
management review. (See the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Z10 consensus
standard.)
Thirty-four states either require employers to establish occupational health and safety management systems or have guidelines that encourage them. Fed-OSHA maintains a website
with links to the programs, which may be a useful resource for advocates interested in pursuing reforms related to health and safety committees or improved education and training
requirements. (https://www.osha.gov/dsg/topics/safetyhealth/states.html)
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Education and Training: Providing Workers a
Knowledge Base for Action
Problem
Too often, workers get incomplete information
and insufficient training from their employers.
To stay safe on the job, workers need to know
about the hazards they may encounter, how to
perform their job tasks safely, and what they
can do to address unsafe conditions or access workers’ compensation after suffering a
job-related injury or illness. Various laws and
regulations require employers to make specific
kinds of information available and provide certain types of training, but these piecemeal rules
often leave workers with only a partial understanding of the hazards they face, their employers’ duties to eliminate or manage the hazards,
and how to exercise their rights.
The problem of insufficient OHS education and
training is especially acute in the sectors of the
labor market that have made widespread use of
temporary labor. Take, for example, the tragic
death of Day Davis at the Bacardi bottling plant
in Jacksonville, Florida. Hired as a temp worker
and eager to prove his mettle on his first day
at a new job, Davis was crushed by a piece
of equipment that was set to run while he was
underneath it cleaning broken bottles. Among
other violations, Fed-OSHA determined that
Bacardi had failed to train Davis on the hazards associated with the equipment or safe use
procedures—such as cutting power to machines
when workers are making repairs or cleaning
up.9 Insufficient training has been an issue in so
many cases involving temporary workers in the
last few years that Fed-OSHA has taken steps to
clarify the joint responsibilities of staffing agencies and host employers with regard to training
requirements.10
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Further complicating matters, training, warning signs, and hazard communications are not
always in the language or format best suited
for the workers who are supposed to benefit
from them. Improper language and format is
an acute problem in industries or geographical
regions that rely heavily on foreign-born workers or those with low literacy.

Solution
Improvements to education and
training requirements can ensure
that workers have the knowledge
they need to demand better OHS
protections. To get a full picture of the health
and safety aspects of their jobs, workers need
to know about all potential hazards, past and
present exposures to any hazards that may be
variable (e.g., chemical exposures), the type
and severity of the harm the hazard can cause,
the regulatory and legal system that places responsibility on employers to eliminate hazards,
and the mechanisms for redress when injuries
or illnesses occur. State legislatures can enact
laws that provide for OHS information-sharing
and training. Unions can also make these demands in contract negotiations, but the recommendations below focus on statutory changes
that would help non-unionized workers, too.
State legislators in every state can take the
simple, commonsense step of requiring employers to inform workers about the education and
training requirements that apply to their jobs.
This requirement would force employers to
regularly review the OHS standards relevant to
their industries and keep track of the training requirements that apply to all jobs that their work-
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ers undertake. Fed-OSHA has more than 100
standards that mandate some type of training
for workers across a range of industries.11 Only
a small number might apply to a given job, but
it is the employer’s responsibility to know what
those requirements are and to ensure they comply with them. State laws mandating that employers disclose to workers the relevant training
regulations would also provide workers with a
virtual checklist that they could use to keep tabs
on whether their employer is providing sufficient
OHS training.
Only state-plan states’ legislators should attempt to expand on Fed-OSHA’s education and
training requirements. The OSH Act’s preemption provisions bar legislators in states covered
by Fed-OSHA from adding to the federal OHS
education and training requirements. State-plan
states that opt to expand on the minimum federal standards could greatly enhance workers’
knowledge of OHS hazards by requiring a more
comprehensive hazard analysis and communication program. Critical elements of that program might include:

n A mechanism for providing all new
hires with OHS-specific training
Legislators should outline in general terms the
minimum requirements of new-hire training
and should authorize the state’s OHS agency to
establish regulations and guidance that will provide employers with additional details. Legislation could set out a minimum number of hours
for training on hazards and on the employer’s
duties to eliminate and manage those hazards
(e.g., eight hours for new hires). It could also
mandate that workers receive training on best
practices for identifying hazards and the procedures for reporting hazards to management,
refusing unsafe work, and reporting unresolved
problems to government agencies.12 As described above, joint labor-management health
and safety committees can be responsible for
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developing worksite-specific training materials,
and worker representatives on those committees
can be responsible for training other workers.

n A requirement that ensures workers
get “refresher” and “new task”
training
Refresher training reinforces to employers that
they bear the ultimate responsibility for workers’
health and safety. It also gives workers an opportunity to refresh their knowledge of hazards
and the ways they are supposed to be eliminated or controlled, to discuss new or emerging
hazards, and to review policies and procedures
for dealing with OHS concerns. Employers also
should be required to provide specialized training any time workers are assigned new tasks or
begin using new equipment.

n Expanded access to injury and illness
records
State legislatures could improve access to individual firms’ injury and illness records, such as
OSHA-300 logs, company audits, and workers’
compensation records, by requiring that the
data be posted online through the state-plan
OHS agency’s website (without revealing workers’ identities). Doing so would enable workers
to access the data at the time and place of their
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choosing. It would also allow potential employees, customers, competitors, contractors, suppliers, and the media to access the data, increasing the number of potential actors who might
press a firm with high injury and illness rates to
take action to create a safer workplace.
A comprehensive hazard analysis and communication program could be tied to the work
of health and safety committees. For instance,
the health and safety committee could develop
training programs, conduct training, and verify
effectiveness. Worker representatives on the
committee also could serve as a resource for
co-workers who need help understanding the
OHS-related information that employers might
be required to provide.
State lawmakers in all states can also mandate
that employers provide workers with information
about the other key program relevant to their
on-the-job health and safety: workers’ compensation. Most states require employers to put up
posters that give workers rudimentary information about the workers’ compensation system,
such as the name of the employer’s workers’
compensation insurer and claims administrator.13 But workers deserve to know more than
just the basics, including:
• The process for filing a claim, including relevant timelines and documentation requirements;
• Information about benefits available through
the workers’ compensation system, including
a clear statement describing benefits that will
be unavailable if a claim is not filed;
• The percentage of claims that the employer
or its insurer appeals, so that workers will
know ahead of time the employer’s track record for challenging workers’ compensation
claims; and
•	A disclosure about workers’ rights to enlist
an attorney at any time after the injury, to
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help navigate the complicated procedures for
obtaining benefits.
Workers also need to know about whistleblower
protections, their legal protections when they
refuse unsafe work, the proper channels for
raising OHS concerns in the workplace, and
how to file a complaint with an OHS agency
if hazardous conditions are not satisfactorily
addressed. (The two sections of this manual
immediately following this section provide details on whistleblower protections and refusing
unsafe work.) These issues can be addressed in
plain-language documents provided to workers
before the first day on the job and on an annual
basis thereafter, as well as on a prominently
displayed poster within the workplace.
Fed-OSHA and various state-plan OHS agencies provide sample documents that employers
can use to educate workers, often in English
and Spanish. State lawmakers in all states
should mandate that employers educate and
train workers in a language and vocabulary that
they understand.

Challenges
The first counter-argument that advocates
should expect to hear when pushing for improved OHS education and training requirements is that Fed-OSHA regulations preempt
states from acting. This argument is primarily a
concern in states that do not have a Fed-OSHAapproved state plan. The U.S. Supreme Court,
in its 1992 Gade decision,14 invalidated an
Illinois regulation that established certain training and certification requirements beyond what
Fed-OSHA’s standards required. The Court’s
ruling creates a barrier to expanding OHS
education and training requirements in states
where Fed-OSHA has authority. Nonetheless,
legislators in states covered by Fed-OSHA might
work around this problem by mandating that
employers simply inform workers of the educa-
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tion and training requirements that apply under
Fed-OSHA’s standards. By not adding new
education or training requirements, the problem
of preemption may be avoided.
For workers, the problem with improved OHS
education and training requirements is that,
in reality, knowledge is not power—power
is power. Workers need a mechanism that
gives them an enforceable power to demand
improved working conditions, based on the
information they receive through improved OHS
education and training requirements. This need
is addressed by some of the other recommendations in this document, including the creation
of workplace health and safety committees with
genuine worker involvement, the enhanced
whistleblower protections, the establishment of a
right to refuse dangerous work, and citizen-suit
provisions. Those recommendations go handin-hand with improved OHS education and
training requirements, which would strengthen
workers’ ability to use those tools.

Examples
In 2012, the Governor of Massachusetts signed
a law known as the Massachusetts Temporary
Worker’s Right to Know Act, which was designed
to combat a number of problems that plague
the temporary or third-party labor market. One
of those problems is that temp workers are often
sent to jobs without any knowledge of what they
will be doing or what health and safety protections they should expect. The Temporary Workers Right to Know Act therefore requires staffing
agencies to provide workers with “job orders”
that include, among other things, disclosure of
whether the position requires special clothing,
tools, licensing, or training.15 This type of reform
could be enacted in any state because it does
not expand on Fed-OSHA standards; it merely
requires an employer to explain the duties it
owes workers.
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California’s workers’ compensation regulations
provide a useful example of state disclosure
requirements that relate specifically to workers’
compensation. Employers must post in each
workplace a one-page poster that provides
workers with an easy-to-understand overview of
the workers’ compensation claims process, as
well as some basic information necessary to initiate the process, such as the employer’s claims
administrator, workers’ compensation insurer,
and contact information for individuals who can
advise injured workers.16 Even more useful, California requires employers to provide workers
with a “Time of Hire” pamphlet that explains the
workers’ compensation system in more detail,
but still in plain, easy-to-understand language.17

A Win for Workers: The
Massachusetts Temporary
Worker Right to Know Act
A Massachusetts coalition of faith leaders, labor organizations, and safety and
other advocacy groups worked with state
agencies and representatives of the staffing industry on legislation to better protect
temporary workers from employer abuse.
Far too many low-wage temp workers
are not told what their job will be or how
much they will be paid. The new state law,
which took effect in January 2013, requires staffing agencies to provide temporary workers basic information about
their job assignments; name and contact
information about the staffing agency; its
workers’ compensation carrier; and any
special clothing, tools, and safety training
for each job assignment.
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Whistleblower Protection Laws: Deputizing
Workers to Identify and Report Hazards
Problem
Workers face powerful disincentives to raise
OHS concerns. Those who do may face retaliation, including having their hours cut or being
fired. Indeed, some employers overtly threaten
workers with such consequences if they report
health and safety problems. Workers may also
face retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims for injuries and illnesses that occur
because of unsafe work environments. All these
forms of retaliation are illegal, but workers
report that they occur often.
Fear of retaliation can strongly discourage
workers from reporting OHS concerns or from
filing workers’ compensation claims. The fear of
retaliation can be greatest for vulnerable, lowwage workers, particularly those working on a
contingent basis, with limited English language
skills, or without protection from a union contract. Beyond employer retaliation, those workers brave enough to report OHS problems to
management or a public agency have paid a
heavy toll, including strained relations with family members and former co-workers, financial
struggles, and extreme emotional trauma.18
All states have some form of whistleblower
protection law, though they vary widely in their
scope and implementation.19 A state law’s narrow coverage or weak remedies can discourage workers from reporting OHS hazards when
they fear retaliation. For instance, state laws
vary with respect to the back pay and benefits
that whistleblowers can recover if an employer
illegally retaliates. When state statutes establish
a system that relies heavily or exclusively on
overburdened government agencies to act as
the gatekeepers for whistleblower claims, poor
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implementation can also be a huge discouragement.20 Across the country, agencies responsible
for reviewing whistleblower complaints have
significant backlogs. Workers can look to the
protections afforded by more than 20 federal
whistleblower laws, though Fed-OSHA is struggling to manage the caseload that comes with
such broad jurisdiction.21
As the eyes and ears on the ground, workers
are the experts in identifying workplace hazards
and recommending fixes before injury or illness
occurs. This whistleblowing role is critical as
OHS agencies’ budgets dwindle, since fewer
inspectors, combined with weak penalty provisions in the law, make it less likely that employers who break the law will be punished severely
enough to discourage them from breaking the
law in the future.

Solution
Every state, whether operating
under a state plan or Fed-OSHA’s
authority, can improve its whistleblower protection laws and make
management changes to ensure improved enforcement of both new and existing laws. Strong
whistleblower protection laws must shield workers against employer retaliation and encourage
them to identify and report OHS hazards. Such
laws are necessary to counter the disincentives that potential whistleblowers face. Society
has a strong interest in rooting out hazardous
workplaces because of the costs they impose on
public health and safety.
A strong state whistleblower protection law
should have five characteristics:
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n Comprehensive coverage
The law should cover both public and private
workers, including those in traditional employment relationships as well as those working on
a contingent or temporary basis. The law’s definition of “employer” should include both host
employers and staffing agencies that provide
temporary labor. Activities protected by the law
should include filing a workers’ compensation
claim for an occupational injury or illness, as
well as identifying and reporting OHS issues,
including reporting injuries and illnesses to the
employer. Oral complaints should be sufficient
to establish coverage under the whistleblower
protection law.

n Simplified process for exercising
whistleblower rights
To be covered, a whistleblower should only be
required to demonstrate that he or she had a
“good faith,” or sincere, belief that the company’s actions or workplace conditions violated a
law or regulation or were otherwise inconsistent
with an important public policy promoted by an
existing law or regulation.22 Workers cannot be
expected to have a sophisticated or exhaustive
understanding of relevant law, so they should
have the right to be protected from retaliation
even if the problem they reported turns out not
to be a violation of the law. Whistleblowers
should be granted flexibility in how they exercise
their rights, so that they are free to report OHS
hazards, as appropriate, to a supervisor, a government official, or the media.23

n Strong safeguards against employer
retaliation
The law should prohibit employers from taking
any form of retaliation, including outright dismissal, suspension, demotion, adverse changes
in work schedules or job tasks, reductions in
compensation or elimination of benefits, nega-
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tive reviews or documentation in the worker’s
personnel file, or pitting worker against worker.
To give the prohibition teeth, the law should
create a private right of action that empowers
workers who have been retaliated against to sue
their employers in court. The law should allow
workers one year (or more) to bring a claim,
starting from the day when the worker acquired
actual knowledge of the retaliatory action. It
should define a successful claim as one in which
a worker is able to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that (1) he or she engaged in a protected whistleblower action, (2)
the employer knew about the protected whistleblower action, (3) the employer took some
prohibited retaliatory action against the worker,
and (4) the protected whistleblower action was a
“contributing cause” of the prohibited retaliatory
action (as opposed to a “but-for cause,” which
makes it too easy for employers to defend prohibited retaliatory actions as the result of other
factors, unrelated to the worker’s whistleblowing activity). This private right of action should
serve as a backup to the existing administrative
process for resolving whistleblower retaliation
claims, whether pursued by Fed-OSHA or stateplan OHS agencies. Administrative processes
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are typically underfunded and fail to provide effective safeguards for whistleblowers who have
experienced retaliation.

n Powerful remedies
The court hearing the case should have the
authority to “make whole” a worker who was
retaliated against for exercising his or her protected whistleblower rights. The remedies available should include restoration to the worker’s
former position with back wages plus interest,
reinstatement of seniority or other advanced
employment status, the reward of any other lost
“fringe benefits” associated with his or her employment, and the removal from a worker’s personnel file of any negative reviews or documentation related to a retaliatory action. The court
should compensate workers who win their cases
for all reasonable legal costs, and the court
should have the authority to award punitive
damages in cases involving particularly egregious conduct by the employer. The law should
require the relevant state agency to maintain a
publicly available database of all successful civil
actions brought by workers who were retaliated
against for exercising their protected whistleblower rights, including the employer involved,
a brief description of the case, and details on
any resulting penalties or orders awarded by
the court. The law should specifically authorize
the judge to order preliminary reinstatement of
a worker to his or her former position, along
with wages and applicable benefits, if the judge
reviewing the worker’s retaliation claim makes
a preliminary determination that the claim is not
frivolous.24 One of the disadvantages of relying
on a private right of action to provide workers
who experience retaliation with some measure
of justice is that resolution of these claims can
take a long time, and many workers simply
cannot afford the delay. Preliminary reinstatement can go a long way toward eliminating the
burden of delay that many whistleblowers face.
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n Effective notice of whistleblower rights
The law should require employers to clearly
explain these rights in a language that workers understand by means of a poster that is
prominently displayed in the workplace and a
written pamphlet to be distributed to workers
at the time of hire and once per year thereafter. Employers should be required to make the
poster and pamphlet notifications available to
workers employed directly by the company and
to contingent and temporary workers.

Challenges
Two important aspects of a strong whistleblower
protection law—the right of workers to sue their
employers in court if they experience retaliation
and the powerful remedies available in successful suits—are likely to be the most contentious.
Advocates pushing for a law that includes these
provisions will likely face a fierce backlash from
business groups and their political allies, particularly in more conservative states. A successful campaign to enact a strong whistleblower
protection law will likely require a lot of time
and effort, but it has the potential to significantly
improve OHS protections for workers.
Business groups claim that strong whistleblower
protection laws undermine their ability to manage their employees effectively. They claim that
disgruntled workers abuse the laws’ protections,
enabling those workers to make false accusations either to antagonize their employers or to
avoid doing work. Businesses also fear that even
well-meaning workers will exercise their whistleblower rights too frequently, leading to workplace
disruptions and decreased productivity.
To respond to these arguments, advocates can
point out that the power to address these concerns resides with the employer. Businesses can
avoid any problems by providing their workers
with effective notice on how the whistleblower
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protection law works—which the law should
instruct them to do—and by cultivating a lawabiding spirit within the company that promotes
the early detection and prompt correction of all
OHS hazards. These efforts will not only preserve workplace harmony; they will also benefit
the company’s bottom line by avoiding the
costly fines, litigation, and negative publicity that
result when unaddressed hazards are discovered during inspections or following serious
accidents and disasters.
The law would leverage the power of state civil
courts to screen out frivolous whistleblower
claims. Civil courts would ensure that whistleblowers meet the burden of proving the four
elements of a retaliation claim, as described
above. Employers would also have the opportunity to rebut the claim by proving that they
would have taken the same allegedly retaliatory
action regardless of the worker’s whistleblowing
activity.

Examples
Every state has some form of whistleblower
protection law, although they vary considerably in their coverage and the safeguards they
provide.25
As one of the most comprehensive state whistleblower protection laws, New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) provides
a great model for activists.26 Though the law
extends to all forms of potential workplace
wrongdoing—including any “activity, policy
or practice of the employer . . . that . . . is in
violation of a law, or a rule or regulation . . .
or [that] is fraudulent or criminal”—it has been
used in several cases to protect workers who
reported OHS violations. CEPA has several
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strengths: public- and private-sector workers are
covered; workers who have been the subject of
a prohibited retaliatory action are empowered
to sue the employer; workers have up to one
year to initiate this lawsuit; workers need only
show that the protected whistleblower action
was a contributing cause of the employer’s prohibited retaliatory action; workers who succeed
in their retaliation lawsuit can obtain powerful
remedies, including restoration to their former
position with back wages, reinstatement of
seniority or other advanced employment status,
the reward of any other lost “fringe benefits,”
and reasonable litigation costs; and, employers
must educate workers about their whistleblower
rights.
CEPA has a few small weaknesses. Workers must report wrongdoing to their employer
first—with limited exceptions—even though
there might be several circumstances in which
an employee would be better off reporting to an
outside party first. The law does not provide for
preliminary reinstatement of workers while their
whistleblower retaliation claims are pending in
court. Also, CEPA does not provide for a public
advocate to help workers bring their whistleblowing claims in court.
One difference between CEPA and the law
recommended above is that CEPA employs a
“reasonableness” standard by requiring that
workers have a reasonable belief that the employer’s activity, policy, or practice constitutes
a covered form of workplace wrongdoing. As
noted above, the recommended law employs a
“good faith” standard for workers to trigger their
whistleblower rights, although some advocates
may find that CEPA’s “reasonableness” standard
fits their circumstances better.
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Workers’ Right to Refuse Dangerous Work:
Empowering Workers to Demand a Safe and Healthy
Workplace
Problem
Too often, when workers encounter a dangerous work situation, they have a tough choice
to make: They can either do work they know to
be dangerous or risk losing their job. It takes a
strong sense of job security for a worker to ask
an employer to fix a dangerous working condition. Especially in low-wage industries, areas
with high unemployment, or worksites with a
weak health and safety culture, workers who
ask their employers to fix hazards often feel that
they are putting themselves at risk of being fired
or suffering other forms of retaliation. To make
matters worse, workers know that any dangerous assignment they refuse will likely be passed
on to a fellow worker instead.
Fed-OSHA regulations provide a limited right to
refuse dangerous work. Workers are not covered unless they have a “reasonable” belief that
(1) the working conditions pose a real danger
of death or serious injury, and (2) there is no
time to get dangerous conditions fixed by calling in a Fed-OSHA inspector. These conditions
are nearly impossible to satisfy, so the regulations provide little meaningful protection. Very
few states have right-to-refuse laws, and the
laws that exist could be strengthened to ensure
a meaningful right for workers to refuse dangerous work.

Solution
Legislatures in all states—both
state-plan and Fed-OSHA states—
can adopt a law that protects
workers’ right to refuse dangerous
assignments or tasks until the identified hazards
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have been corrected. Ultimately, the law would
give workers the power to compel their employers to fix dangerous conditions that could cause
injury, illness, or death. Unions can also establish right-to-refuse procedures through collective bargaining agreements, although statewide
protections for all workers are a more protective
solution.
The central issue for advocates in campaigning
for a right-to-refuse law is how to define when
a worker is protected in exercising the right. If
the language is too broad, then it will encounter vigorous opposition from business groups
who will complain that the law could be too
easily abused by workers making false or weak
claims. If the language is too narrow, then it
may be too difficult for workers to exercise their
right to refuse and the law would not provide
any meaningful protections. The two most common standards are a “good faith” standard
and a “reasonableness” standard.27 The “good
faith” standard is arguably easier for workers to
satisfy than the “reasonableness” standard and
would therefore be likely to offer greater protections to workers.
Advocates should consider pushing for a law
that requires a worker to have a “good faith,”
or sincere, belief that a task or assignment violates a law, standard, regulation, or “clear mandate of public policy” (including those related to
OHS matters), or otherwise amounts to a criminal act. This language would empower workers
to refuse to work in many dangerous situations
while also providing a clear legal standard that
will help assuage employers’ concerns about
potential abuse by disgruntled employees.
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Some recognized occupational hazards do not
technically violate laws, standards, regulations, or policies, so a worker would not have
a protected right to refuse work based on these
hazards. For example, few states have clear
standards to adequately protect workers while
they are working in excessive heat. Without such
a standard, a worker is left to argue that such
conditions violate a clear mandate of public
policy, which may be a difficult point to prove.
Nonetheless, the suggested language is arguably the broadest and most flexible language
that is also politically viable in most states.
A strong right-to-refuse law will include other
key elements:

n Broad coverage
State right-to-refuse laws should cover all workers. The law should cover both public- and
private-sector workers, including contingent and
temporary workers as well as workers in a traditional employer-employee relationship.

n Effective notice
The law should require employers to provide
workers with effective notification of their right to
refuse dangerous work, exactly as provided for
in the recommended state whistleblower protection law described above (i.e., through a prominently displayed poster and written pamphlets
distributed at the time of hire and every year).

n A “private right of action”
The law should authorize workers to sue their
employers in court and to seek a wide variety of
damages if they experience retaliation for exercising their right to refuse covered work tasks.
***
In workplaces with joint labor-management
health and safety committees, the committees
can play a critical role in disputes about a work-
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er’s right to refuse dangerous work. For example, Ontario’s right-to-refuse law only requires
that the worker have reason to believe that a
particular task or assignment is dangerous and
then relies on some kind of independent worker
representative or an established health and
safety committee to investigate and filter out any
potentially invalid claims.28 This approach has
the advantage of allowing workers to bring a
wider range of claims to trigger their right to refuse—even those that do not technically violate
laws, standards, regulations, or policies. Relying
on a third party to help initially address workers’
claims would help to ensure that the law is not
abused, which would make the proposed law
more politically viable.
The other advantage of a right-to-refuse law
that relies on health and safety committees for
sifting out valid claims is that the law can also
establish a clear process for resolving those
claims in a way that both addresses the dangerous conditions and minimizes disruption of the
workplace. For example, similar to the Ontario
law, a state right-to-refuse law could mandate
the following process:

n Internal investigation
After receiving notice from a worker about a
hazard, the law should require the employer or
supervisor to investigate the allegedly hazardous
conditions in cooperation with a member of the
health and safety committee. Based upon this investigation, if the employer agrees that a hazard
exists, the employer must consult with the worker
and the health and safety committee member
on the appropriate ways to correct the situation.
Alternatively, the employer must explain why the
conditions are not actually hazardous.

n External review
If the reporting worker does not accept the
employer’s explanation that the workplace
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conditions do not pose a hazard, or if the reporting worker does not agree that the employer’s
actions to fix the hazard are adequate, then he or
she should report the situation to the appropriate
OHS agency. In state-plan states, the law should
require the state-plan OHS agency official to consult with both the reporting worker and the health
and safety committee involved as part of the
investigation. The worker may continue to refuse
the dangerous work task until the government
inspector has determined that conditions are safe
following an investigation of the situation.

n Documentation
The law should require the employer to keep
a written record of the event, explain how any
reported OHS concerns were addressed, and
provide a copy to the worker who brought the
hazard to the employer’s attention.

n Maintenance of benefits
The law should specifically require the employer
to maintain the reporting worker’s normal
compensation rate at all times while the worker
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is exercising his or her right to refuse dangerous work. The employer may give the worker an
alternative work assignment while the situation
is being resolved.

n Information sharing
Whenever a worker exercises his or her right to
refuse a dangerous work task, the law should
require the employer to inform any other workers of the reported dangerous conditions before
assigning that task to them. The law should
authorize the other workers to independently
assert their own right to refuse the task on the
basis of the reported dangerous conditions.

Challenges
Business groups will likely charge that a strong
state right-to-refuse law would undermine
employers’ ability to effectively manage their
workforces. Specifically, they might argue that
the law could encourage workers to abuse the
law’s protections in order to harass their bosses
or shirk their assigned duties. They might also
contend that even appropriate uses of the
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right to refuse dangerous work could become
a needless distraction, resulting in decreased
productivity.
Advocates can respond to these arguments in
several ways. They can point out that the fundamental reason for the right-to-refuse law is
to ensure that hazards are identified and fixed
before harm occurs. As a result, its provisions
could actually promote productivity for many
businesses and eliminate costs associated with
injuries, illnesses, and “close call” incidents.
Advocates can also explain that the procedures
for exercising the right to refuse dangerous work
are designed to discourage abuse and to promote a cooperative and productive relationship
between employers and workers. Under a law
with the characteristics described above, workers would need to have a “good faith” belief
that undertaking the task or assignment would
violate law, standard, regulation, or policy. Tying the workers’ right to laws, regulations, or
policies will give employers an objective tool for
denying potentially abusive claims, and encourage workers to exercise this right only when it
is appropriate. Similarly, a law that relies on an
independent third party, such as a joint labormanagement health and safety committee, to
screen cases will help filter out potential misuse
of the law’s protections.
A study of Ontario’s strong right-to-refuse law
suggests that business groups’ concerns about
abuse and disruption are misplaced. Researchers found no evidence that workers used their
right to refuse dangerous work to harass their
employers, but they did find that workers made
more frequent use of the right in workplaces
with poor labor relations.29 These results underscore the importance of ensuring that workers
have a properly balanced power relationship
with their employers, which a strong right-torefuse law can help to promote.
Business groups may also argue that states
would be preempted from adopting a strong
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right-to-refuse law, because Fed-OSHA regulations establish a limited right to refuse dangerous work. This argument is relevant in states
without Fed-OSHA-approved state plans, but
it is not a strong argument. Advocates can
respond by noting that according to the U.S.
Supreme Court, only federal “health and safety
standards” preempt state laws covering similar
issues (see the How to Use this Manual section, above). Advocates can make the case that
Fed-OSHA’s right-to-refuse regulation is not
a “health and safety standard” as that term is
defined in the OSH Act because it is not aimed
at correcting a particular hazard or risk. Thus,
states without Fed-OSHA-approved state plans,
like their state-plan neighbors, can adopt strong
right-to-refuse laws.

Examples
New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) provides a good model for
advocates that want to campaign for a strong
right-to-refuse law that does not rely on health
and safety committees. Pushing for a law that
establishes health and safety committees may
be politically impossible in some states, so advocates may prefer to push for a right-to-refuse
law based on CEPA, which can provide effective
protections for workers on its own. Alternatively,
advocates may prefer to campaign for a rightto-refuse law based on Ontario’s. The disadvantage of this approach is that, in states that
do not require health and safety committees,
advocates would have to push for a strong law
on health and safety committees, along the lines
described above, first or simultaneously with
their efforts to push for a strong right-to-refuse
law. Advocates may find this extra challenge to
be worth the effort, since an Ontario-like rightto-refuse law would arguably provide broader
protections for workers, and it could include
provisions that clearly establish the process for
workers to exercise their right to refuse dangerous work, as explained above.
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Citizen Suits: Empowering Workers to Sue
Employers over Hazards
Problem
Unlike federal environmental laws, many of
which have so-called “citizen suit” provisions,
the nation’s OHS laws do not allow workers to
sue their employers in court for failing to comply with health and safety standards.30 OHS
agencies’ resource constraints are the root of
the problem, but a budgetary fix is unlikely.
With approximately 9 million worksites in the
United States and new health and safety challenges arising constantly, OHS agencies simply
do not employ enough inspectors to keep a
close watch on employers’ compliance. FedOSHA employs approximately 1,000 inspectors
and supervisors.31 State-plan states add perhaps 1,200 more inspectors to the total. With a
combined inspection workforce that is rivalled in
number by some suburban high schools, it is no
wonder that major workplace disasters are often followed by media reports that the employer
had rarely, if ever, seen an OHS inspector.32
AFL-CIO calculates that it would take FedOSHA and state-plan OHS agencies anywhere from 30 to nearly 300 years to inspect
every worksite in the United States, based on
the number of worksite in each state and the
number of inspections that the state’s inspectors typically conduct in a year.33 At that rate, the
average worker might as well assume that she
will never see an OHS inspector. So what is she
to do when her employer fails to comply with
the basic rules set out by state or federal OHS
standards? To take preventative action before
she or a co-worker is injured, the best course
of action is to file a complaint with an OHS
agency.34 If the complaint alleges an OHS violation with sufficient specificity, the agency will
dispatch an inspector to the worksite to investi-

Chapter 1: Empowering Workers

gate. But even here, agency resources constrain
responses. Fed-OSHA has adopted a policy
stating that these inspections will only focus on
the alleged hazard and whatever clearly visible
other hazards an inspector comes across in the
course of investigating the complaint. It is rare
that an inspection instigated by a complaint will
result in a “wall to wall” approach and identify
hazards that are not immediately visible.

Solution
State legislatures can empower
workers by giving them the power
to file lawsuits demanding compliance with OHS laws, similar
to the right to file citizen suits on violations of
environmental laws. State and federal environmental agencies face an imbalance between
their enforcement resources and the size of the
regulated community that’s comparable to OHS
agencies’ shortfalls. The solution in the environmental arena, as it should be in the OHS context, was to give concerned citizens the power
to enforce environmental laws. “Citizen suit”
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provisions in certain statutes essentially deputize
the entire U.S. population to help enforce the law.
Legislators in state-plan states could enact legislation that incorporates the citizen suit into their
state-law programs. The basic contours of the
statute could parallel existing environmental citizen suit provisions, giving any person the power
to file suit against any other person or entity that
violates OHS laws. This “private right of action”
would be available after the person who intends
to file the lawsuit has provided the employer
and the state-plan OHS agency a “notice of
intent to sue” that identifies the alleged violations. Upon receipt of the notice, the state-plan
OHS agency should treat it as it would a formal
complaint. The notice gives the employer an
opportunity to correct the problem or—if it fails
to do so—gives the state-plan OHS agency the
opportunity to open an investigation and issue
citations. The purpose of requiring potential citizen suit plaintiffs to file a notice of intent to sue
is to reduce burdens on the court system.
In complex environmental cases, companies
faced with a potential citizen suit often urge
the environmental agency to file a suit to forestall the citizen suit, on the assumption that the
agency might settle the case on terms more favorable to them than the private lawsuit would.
The same could be expected of employers faced
with a potential OHS citizen suit. To prevent
sweetheart deals that leave workers at risk, OHS
citizen suit laws should clarify that a person who
files a notice of intent to sue will be presumptively included in the inspection as a worker
representative and will be allowed to participate in settlement negotiations and intervene in
litigation if the employer contests any citation or
abatement order.
Courts that hear environmental citizen suits have
struggled with the issue of “standing,” a constitutional constraint on courts’ authority to hear
particular cases that is intended to ensure that
only parties with a legitimate interest in the out28

come of a lawsuit can initiate it. Any legislature
that adopts an OHS citizen suit statute should
clarify that the intended beneficiaries who have
standing to sue include not only workers who
fit longstanding definitions of “employees,” but
also independent contractors and temporary
workers supplied by staffing firms. Legislatures
should also grant standing to third-party representatives such as unions, worker centers, and
other community-based organizations with close
ties to workers.
A final important piece of the puzzle is to ensure
that workers and their representatives can afford
to bring these suits. In other lawsuits, judges
and juries can require those who lose the case
to pay large sums of money in damages, which
can be used to pay for the winning side’s legal
costs. These damages would not be available
in citizen suits, but the plaintiffs need a way to
recoup the costs of bringing a case. A state law
allowing OHS citizen suits should include a provision that awards reasonable attorney’s fees to
individuals or organizations that initiate successful citizen suits or citizen suit-based inspections.
That provision could be modeled on the federal
Equal Access to Justice Act, which ensures that a
party that is successful in certain kinds of litigation, including many citizen suits, can recoup
reasonable costs of bringing the case in federal
court.

Challenges
Empowering the public to bring citizen suits to
enforce OHS laws would be such a revolutionary change to the way those laws are enforced
and to the power relationship between workers
and employers that advocates can expect fierce
opposition to any campaign aimed at winning
a citizen suit law at the state level. Advocates
have mounted such campaigns in the past and
failed—indeed, citizen suits were part of the
debate in the lead-up to passage of the OSH
Act in 1970. A state-level campaign to establish
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OHS citizen suits may be worth pursuing because it offers a good narrative about the need
to empower workers as a solution to problems
arising from government austerity measures.
The employer community’s main arguments opposing the OHS citizen suit idea will likely center
on courts’ crowded dockets. State legislators
often work to cut down on the number of lawsuits filed by private plaintiffs, so making every
worker a potential litigant, without requiring
evidence of physical harm, may be contrary to
their goals of reducing litigation. But advocates
could counter by explaining the plaintiffs’ incentives in citizen suits do not encourage excessive
litigation. The remedies will often be injunctive—that is, a judge will require an employer to
take or stop a particular action—so no lawyers
will be winning huge pay days and this new
field of law is unlikely to attract the attention
of attorneys looking to pad their purses. Many
cases will settle out of court since the standards
at issue have been enforced by government
agencies for years and few questions about
applicability and enforceability remain. The
proposed requirement of a notice of intent to
sue will also ensure that most cases are resolved
administratively.
Chapter 1: Empowering Workers

For workers, the biggest challenge with citizen
suits will be dealing with retaliation. As noted
above, the anti-retaliation provisions in state
and federal whistleblower laws are inconsistent
and rarely give workers sufficient protection.
Workers need assurances that filing or providing support in a citizen suit will not endanger
their prospects for continued or future employment. A strong whistleblower protection law
would be an essential companion to a citizen
suit law to enforce OHS standards.

Examples
The federal Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA) provide the best examples of how
a citizen suit provision can strengthen a public
health statute.35 Like OHS agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency and its state agency
partners have resource constraints that make
it difficult to monitor the thousands of permits
issued to businesses that pollute air and water.
Environmental advocacy groups, however, have
used the citizen suit provisions in the CAA and
CWA to enforce the pollution limits set out in
permits.
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Chapter 2: Making Sure
Crime Doesn’t Pay

F

ed-OSHA and its state-plan partners
spend a majority of their resources
on enforcement activities. In a typical year, they will conduct roughly 100,000
worksite inspections, and inspectors find
serious hazards in a majority of cases. The
consequences for employers who put workers in harm’s way need to fit the gravity of
the situation. Too often, employers get away
with what amounts to little more than a slap
on the wrist for sending workers into unsafe trenches or oxygen-depleted confined
spaces, or for using old machinery without
proper guards for protecting against unexpected start-ups. Significant fines and the
threat of extended time in prison would serve
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two functions: penalizing employers who are
caught endangering workers, and deterring
other employers from making similar bad
choices about worker protections.
In this section, we suggest ways to strengthen
the penalties that can be imposed on employers who violate OHS laws and describe
a change to administrative procedures that
would ensure employers start fixing dangerous conditions as soon as OHS agency
inspectors issue citations. We conclude the
section with a list of government databases
that workers and their advocates can use
to target employers or local industries that
deserve shaming for their failure to provide
safe and healthy workplaces.
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Fix It First: Closing the Loophole that Allows Employers
to Avoid Fixing Health and Safety Hazards
Problem
In all but two states, when an employer receives
a citation for failing to comply with OHS laws,
the agency that uncovered the violation lacks
authority to force the employer to fix the problem immediately unless workers face an imminent danger, a shortcoming in the law that
leaves workers exposed to dangerous conditions. Experts often refer to this as the “abatement during appeals” problem. When OHS
agencies issue citations, the law requires that
they include an abatement order that sets a
reasonable date by which the employer must fix
the cited problem. But because of a loophole
in the OSH Act and most state laws, the employer can avoid fixing the problem by simply
filing an appeal of the citation or the proposed
abatement date. The appeals process can last
months or even years, and the longer it takes,
the more likely it is that the unfixed problem will
lead to injury or death. In 2009, for example, a
construction worker died after falling through an
improperly guarded floor hole at a Connecticut
casino. While the company was contesting FedOSHA’s citation, another worker fell through
a similarly improperly guarded hole and was
permanently disabled. According to Fed-OSHA,
there were 33 contested cases between 1999
and 2009 in which another worker died at the
same worksite while the employers fought the
citation.36
Agencies that want the most serious hazards to
be fixed right away are forced to bargain with
employers, quickly settling for sharply reduced
penalties in exchange for faster abatement.37
The case against Tesoro Corporation following
a comprehensive inspection of its Anacortes,
Washington oil refinery provides a striking
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example. In 2008, before Washington enacted
a law that closed the loophole, the state-plan
OHS agency found 17 violations, many of
which implicated poor management of “process
safety,” involving highly hazardous chemicals
that have the potential to cause a catastrophic
incident. When Tesoro challenged the citations,
the agency ended up reducing the proposed
penalty from $85,700 to $12,250 and withdrawing 14 of the cited violations in order to
persuade the company to drop its appeal, fix
the hazards, and submit to an independent
audit.38
This loophole is a growing problem. Fed-OSHA
enforcement data show that employers are challenging citations at an increasing rate. From
2005 to 2008, employers appealed 11 percent
of state and federal safety citations, and over
the next four years, that rate doubled to 22
percent. In 2011 alone, employers contested
more than 33 percent of citations.39 Some industries are notorious for routinely filing appeals.
From 2000 to 2010, oil refineries contested 53
percent of all safety violations, and the average
contested case took 20 months to resolve.40 In
all these cases, the employer may forestall fixing
the hazard until the appeal is resolved, leaving
workers exposed to hazards that OHS agency
officials have determined violate the law.

Solution
State-plan jurisdictions can ensure
that workers are better protected
by adopting legislation that
requires employers to fix serious
hazards by the deadline stated in the abatement
order, whether or not they choose to appeal
the underlying citation. Mandating a quick
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fix ensures immediate protection for workers
and puts employers and enforcement officials
on more equal footing in settlement negotiations. When employers are already required to
fix problems right away, they cannot use their
workers’ safety as a high-stakes bargaining
chip to demand penalty reductions. An effective campaign would emphasize that the issue
is about scofflaw companies that are using the
appeals process to “game the system” at workers’ expense, not employers raising legitimate
disputes over inspection findings. Closing this
loophole in Fed-OSHA states would require action by Congress.
Since employers sometimes have genuine disputes about the existence of violative conditions,
these laws should include an expedited process
through which an employer could object to
the abatement order. This would be a process
separate from the normal appeals procedures
in which the employer challenges the underlying citation. The laws should address five issues
related to the expedited process for appealing
abatement orders:

n Issues for consideration
The expedited process should give the employer
the opportunity to raise legitimate questions
about the reasonableness of the abatement
deadline. It should also give the employer the
opportunity to challenge the existence of a
violation, since the absence of a violation would
negate the need for abatement. Since the expedited process focuses on the abatement order—
not the underlying citation—challenges to the
characterization of a violation (serious versus
willful, for example) and challenges to proposed
penalties should not be addressed.

n Remedies
The expedited process will result in a limited
remedy for the employer. If the official who
hears the challenge agrees with the employer,
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the official should only have the authority to
grant a stay of the abatement order. Thus, the
employer would be allowed to postpone fixing the alleged hazards until its appeal of the
underlying citation is resolved.

n The criteria for deciding the challenge
The employer should bear the burden of proving two points to obtain a stay of the abatement
order. First, the employer must demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of success on the contested issues. In other words, the employer must
prove that it is likely to win when it contests the
period of abatement or existence of a violation in the actual appeal. Second, the employer
must show that a stay would not adversely affect
workers’ health or safety.

n Workers’ rights to participate
The law should require that employees and
their representatives be notified and allowed to
participate in the abatement hearing, in case
they want to argue against a stay. The employer
or any affected employees that were parties to
the hearing should have the right to appeal the
decision to grant or deny the stay.

n Timelines
The hearing should be scheduled soon after an
employer files the motion for a stay of abatement (e.g., within 15 days), and the decision
on whether to grant the stay should be made
quickly as well (e.g., within 15 days of the hearing). Throughout this process, the period of
time given by the OHS agency to fix the hazard
would remain in place (i.e., the clock would
continue to tick on the abatement order).

Challenges
In 2013, California lawmakers attempted to
close the abatement loophole and ran into
challenges that advocates can expect to see in
other states. One of the main arguments raised
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by opponents of the bill was that they would be
denied “due process” if they were required to fix
hazards before having the opportunity to prove
through the appeals process that Cal/OSHA’s
citation was invalid or that no violation actually
occurred.41
But this argument ignores all the procedural
protections for employers that would be built
into the new system. Employers would have
the chance to argue for a stay at a promptly
scheduled hearing, and if it appeared that their
arguments against the citation or the abatement
requirement were sound, and workers wouldn’t
be put in danger, they would likely succeed.
Even if a stay request were denied, the employer
would still have the opportunity to appeal that
decision to a higher reviewing body.
The California legislature ultimately passed the
bill, but the Governor vetoed it, arguing that the
creation of a new, separate hearing process for
deciding stay requests would be unnecessarily
costly and duplicative. The experiences of states
that already require abatement during appeal,
however, suggest that separate hearings will not
be too burdensome or costly: In Washington,
employers request a stay of abatement less than
2 percent of the time, and only 10 percent of
those cases actually go into the expedited hearing process. An agency official in Oregon said
that the number of stay requests he received
over 23 years could be “counted on one hand.”
Advocates can also note that, far from being too
costly, an abatement law would bring the state
more revenue, because employers would not be
able to demand penalty reductions in exchange
for fixing hazards promptly.
The governor of California claimed the problem
of unabated hazards could be solved merely by
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expediting the existing appeals process and/or
making sure that appeals of serious violations
are put at the front of the line. But that approach would be inadequate. Employers would
continue to obtain automatic stays by filing
appeals, which could delay the fixing of hazards
for months even with an expedited process. Just
as important, government promises to speed up
the process may be unreliable. Even if delays
are reduced at first, changes in department
budgets and staffing can result in growing backlogs of cases.

Examples
Advocates can look to a number of different
models in designing a bill to close this loophole.
Two pieces of federal legislation are particularly
well developed and offer the strongest protections for workers. The Protecting America’s
Workers Act (PAWA, introduced in Congress
in 2009, 2011, and 2013) and the Robert C.
Byrd Mine and Workplace Safety and Health Act
(introduced in Congress in 2010, 2011, 2012,
and 2013) are two bills that would have closed
the abatement loophole in the OSH Act, thereby
ensuring quick fixes in every state.42 These bills
formed the basis for the solution proposed
above. The relevant language is nearly identical
in both bills.
Mine workers, whose health and safety is policed
by the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) instead of Fed-OSHA, benefit from a
statute that requires their employers to abate
hazards by the time stated in the citation, regardless of any appeals.43 Under the Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, employers who want to challenge the citation or the deadline for fixing the
hazard are entitled to an expedited hearing.44
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Examples of Existing and Proposed State Laws that Require Abatement
during Appeals
• Oregon: Since the inception of Oregon OSHA in 1973, its statute has required employers
to correct serious violations as they are appealing the citations. If they choose to challenge
the abatement deadline, a hearing on that issue is conducted “as soon as possible.” (ORS
654.078(5)-(6)) Employers complained loudly about the policy at first, but they quickly
adapted once it was put into place.
• Washington: In 2011, the state enacted a law requiring employers to correct hazards even
if they choose to appeal the citations. Compared to the solution proposed above, this law
sets a more lenient standard for granting stays: Stays are granted unless the evidence suggests there is a “substantial probability” of death or serious harm to workers, and if employers appeal, they can obtain a stay unless it is “more likely than not” that it would result
in death or serious harm. Also, employers who have requested stays do not have to abate
the hazard while their requests are being considered, which could take up to 120 working
days (almost six months) from the issuance of the citation. (RCW 49.17.140)
• California: In 2013, lawmakers passed a strong bill that blended elements of the PAWA
bill (the criteria for granting stays) and Washington’s law (allowing the state OHS agency to
postpone the requirement to fix hazards while the employer’s request for a stay is pending),
but, as noted above, the governor vetoed it. A similar bill has been introduced in 2014,
giving the agency discretion to grant a stay as long as it will not adversely affect worker
health and safety. (AB 1634, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014))
• Tennessee: In February 2014, lawmakers introduced a bill that would require immediate
fixes only for willful, repeat, and failure-to-abate violations. In all other respects, the bill
closely follows California’s approach in 2013. (HB 2017, 108th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2006))
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Expanded Civil Penalties: Making It Expensive to
Endanger Workers
Problem
Maximum civil penalties for OHS violations are
far too low to effectively deter employers from
breaking workplace health and safety laws.
In states covered by Fed-OSHA, serious violations (causing a substantial probability of death
or serious physical harm) carry a maximum
penalty of just $7,000, and penalties for willful and repeat violations are capped at a mere
$70,000 (with a minimum of $5,000 for willful
violations). Such penalties offer little deterrent
effect. Moreover, because the penalty amounts
are not indexed for inflation and have not been
updated since 1990, they effectively become
lower each year (see Figure 1). If the penalty
amounts had been indexed for inflation, they
would be 80 percent greater than what they
are now (as of 2014). These penalty amounts,
which are largely mirrored in the state-plan programs, are embarrassingly low, especially when
compared to penalties for actions that threaten
the environment or wild animals. For example,
the EPA can impose a penalty of $25,000 per
day for some violations of the Clean Air Act,
and the maximum penalty for a single violation
of the South Pacific Tuna Act is $350,000.
In practice, most penalties never even approach
the meager maximum permitted under the law.
The OSH Act requires Fed-OSHA to consider
the employer’s size, good faith, and history
of violations in determining the appropriate
penalty amount. Over the years, the “consider”
requirement has morphed into written policies that require inspectors to apply significant
penalty reductions based on these factors in
virtually all cases. For example, Fed-OSHA
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starts with a penalty based on the gravity of the
violation, then routinely reduces this penalty by
20, 40, or 60 percent for the employer’s size,
by another 15, 25, or 35 percent if the employer has documentation of an OHS management
system, and by another 10 percent if the employer has had no citations in the last few years.
For most violations, Fed-OSHA also reduces the
proposed penalty by 15 percent if the employer
fixes the hazard during the inspection or within
the next 24 hours. Significantly, agency officials
apply these reductions before even issuing citations, so the already-reduced penalties attached
to citations become the baseline for settlement
negotiations between the agency and the employer. During these negotiations, penalties are
often further reduced to a mere fraction of the
amount originally proposed.
Between July 2007 and June 2009, 98 percent of employers cited by Fed-OSHA received
penalty reductions, and the Office of Inspector
General concluded that $127 million in reductions (about one-third of the total) may have
been inappropriately granted.
Many state programs have an even worse
track record. A number of states automatically
reduce their proposed penalties just because
the employer was “cooperative,” without any
further justification. The average penalty for a
serious violation under the state plans is a mere
$1,011, compared to $1,895 in Fed-OSHA
jurisdictions; the average in South Carolina
is just $538. For repeat violations, the average state-plan penalty is $2,412, compared to
$6,272 under Fed-OSHA (both a far cry from
the $70,000 maximum).
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Solution: Update civil penalty
amounts

enough to put it in a significantly worse position
than employers who complied.

Legislators in state-plan states
should enact laws that strengthen
the penalizing and deterrent effects of OHS agencies’ civil pen45
alties. The updated laws should address four
issues:

n Enhanced penalties for violations
that cause or contribute to a death or
serious bodily harm
When an employer’s failure to abide by the law
results in more than increasing the risk of injury—when it actually results in injury or death—
enhanced penalties are appropriate. Legislators
could mandate penalty ranges of $20,000 to
$50,000 per serious violation and $50,000
to $250,000 per willful or repeat violation for
violations that result in a worker’s death. Those
ranges are appropriate for violations that lead
to serious bodily harm as well, since whether
workers or killed or “simply” injured is often a
matter of chance. More ambitious ranges or
even flat mandatory penalties without a range
might be feasible in some states.

n Economic “benefits” of noncompliance
Legislators should set penalties so that employers cannot simply absorb them as if they were
merely a cost of doing business. Effective deterrence would require that the imposed penalty
at least recapture the amount of money that
the employer “saved” by failing to comply, and
take an additional chunk out of its profits—large

Figure 1: Maximum Penalty OSH Act Serious Violation
Adjusted for Inflation (2013 dollars)
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*Note: Congress amended the OSH Act in 1990, increasing the maximum penalty for a serious violation from $1,000 to $7,000.
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n Inflation
All federal public health agencies except FedOSHA update their civil penalties to account for
inflation, making automatic adjustments based on
the Consumer Price Index once every four years.46
Just as Congress should amend the law to cover
Fed-OSHA, state legislatures could adopt a similar statute to cover state-plan agencies.

n Repeat offenders
The mandatory minimum penalty for willful violations should be extended to repeat violations,
to ensure chronic violators receive more than
just a slap on the wrist.

Solution: Mandatory minimum
penalties for certain persistent
hazards
Some specific and deadly OHS
violations recur with disturbing
regularity, despite the obvious
nature of the hazard and the
existence of clear safety standards or wellknown methods of mitigating the hazard. These
violations, described in detail in the box below,
are likely to lead to injuries and fatalities by
exposure to poison gases in a confined space,
cave-ins of unsupported holes or trenches that
trap the people digging them, crushing or
suffocation in a grain storage bin or silo, and
mangling or crushing by a machine that was
not guarded.
States should adopt special mandatory minimum penalties to deter these violations. Given
the nature of the hazards and the obvious and
simple prevention measures available, mandatory minimum penalties should be set at
three-quarters of the relevant maximum penalty
for the violation at issue (i.e., serious, willful,
repeat). Whether the violations are discovered
during a routine inspection or in the aftermath
of a fatality or serious injury, they should be
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subject to the new mandatory minimums. These
minimums would send a clear message to employers that they will pay a substantial amount
if they continue to disregard these well-known
hazards.
Advocates may want to consider other hazards
that warrant mandatory minimum penalties.
High-profile fatalities or catastrophes may provoke sufficient public outrage that legislators will
become inclined to enact mandatory minimums
for violations like the ones that caused those
events.

Solution: Improve penalty
calculations and eliminate
unwarranted reductions
Legislators can further strengthen
civil penalties by putting constraints on OHS agencies’
penalty-adjustment policies. As
noted above, OHS agencies must consider an
employer’s size, history of compliance, and
“good faith” before proposing penalties. A law
increasing the maximum available penalties
may not have any real impact if state-plan OHS
agencies continue routinely to reduce penalties
by significant amounts for such reasons.
One approach to improving penalty calculations is to discontinue the use of reductions
that have essentially become entitlements.
OHS officials apply some reductions to virtually
every citation thus undercutting any meaningful incentive for employers to improve their
safety practices. Advocates could directly lobby
their state-plan OHS agencies to stop this
practice. However, the best way to ensure that
these changes become permanent would be to
convince the state legislature to prohibit such
unwarranted reductions by law.
The most powerful change that state-plan states
could make would be to eliminate the require-
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Examples of Violations for which Mandatory Minimum Fines Are Warranted
Confined Spaces: Confined spaces, such as manholes, cargo tanks, sewer lines, and pipes, can be especially
dangerous places to work. These enclosed areas can often contain poisonous gases and not enough oxygen.
Employers are required to train workers who are expected to enter a confined space and provide them with a
monitoring device to test for gases while they are inside of it. If the atmosphere in the confined space is hazardous,
it must be ventilated or otherwise purged to ensure it is not dangerous before a worker can enter the space. When
a worker enters a confined space, another trained individual must remain outside the confined space to keep an
eye on the worker. Confined spaces can be unpredictable, and someone needs to be able to begin appropriate
rescue procedures if the worker inside the space shows signs of being overcome by poison gases. The employer
must ensure that training for rescue procedures is conducted and the equipment necessary for a safe rescue is
available. An OSHA regulation designed to save the lives of workers who have to enter confined spaces has been
on the books since 1993. (29 CFR 1910.146)
Trenching: Working inside a deep dirt hole that is not properly secured can be deadly. If the soil caves in, a worker can be buried alive, or suffocate while others attempt a rescue. Employers are required to take a number of
steps before any worker is allowed to enter a trench that is more than five feet deep. When a worker is supposed
to enter a trench, an individual designated by the employer who has received special training must examine the
trench’s condition. It must be inspected daily, or whenever conditions change in the trench or in the surrounding
area. Depending on the trench depth, the specially trained individual will also determine whether the trench needs
to be made with a particular design or reinforced with special barriers to prevent a cave-in. Employers are also
required to ensure that workers have a way to safely enter and exit the trench, such as ladder or ramp. An OSHA
regulation designed to save the lives of workers from trench collapses has been on the books since 1989. (29
CFR 1926.650 – 1926.652)
Grain handling: Grain silos (tall and skinny) and grain bins (round and squat) are often part of the scenery in
farming communities. These structures can hold hundreds of thousands of bushels of corn, wheat, rice, soybeans,
and other dried crops. When workers are required to enter them without the proper equipment and training,
the silos and bins can be deadly. The grain can behave like quicksand, pulling a worker in to die from suffocation. Employers are required to provide workers with a body harness and lifeline that is that is fastened before
the worker enters the grain bin. Another trained individual must be stationed outside the structure and must keep
the worker in constant sight. Toxic gases can also accumulate in grain bins and silos. Employers are required to
provide the appropriate equipment to allow workers to test the air inside the bin for enough oxygen. An OSHA
regulation designed to save the lives of workers who enter grain storage structures has been on the books since
1987. (29 CFR 1910.272)
Safety guards: Many pieces of machinery—from saws at lumberyards and punch presses in manufacturing, to
meat slicers, mortar mixers, and industrial garbage compactors—have guarding systems that prevent workers from being struck by or caught in the equipment. Some guards create a barrier between the moving parts
and the user, while others use light sensors, tripping devices, or other electronics to prevent the machinery from
operating until a worker’s hands or other body parts are out of the danger zone. Employers are responsible for
ensuring that all machines and tools are equipped with effective guarding systems and that those systems are
maintained. Machine guarding is one of the oldest safety practices put in place to protect workers’ limbs and
lives. Fed-OSHA’s standards on guarding systems date back to 1970. (OSHA 29 CFR 1910.212)
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the allowed time period and observe the speed
limit henceforth.
An even more limited approach to improving
penalty calculations is to ensure that all stateplan OHS agencies have adopted the most
recent Fed-OSHA penalty-reduction policies. In
October 2010, Fed-OSHA improved its policies
for calculating and adjusting penalties. Since
the changes were put into effect, the average
Fed-OSHA penalty has more than doubled,
although penalty amounts remain far below
the statutory maximums. State legislators could
instruct state-plan OHS agencies to adopt the
same policies as Fed-OSHA, which include:
ment that OHS agencies consider the size, history, and good-faith penalty-reduction factors. If
it is not possible to convince a state legislature
to establish mandatory minimum penalties for
particular violations or to increase statutory
maximum penalties across the board, eliminating the penalty reduction factors would ensure
that current maximum penalties attach to all
cited violations, effectively increasing penalties.
As inflation has eroded the real cost of penalties
and agency budget cuts make it less likely that
inspection histories provide any meaningful insight into a company’s OHS record, the penalty
reduction factors have become less justifiable.
More targeted reforms may be easier to push
through a legislature. One fix would be to
prohibit agencies from applying the maximum
allowed reduction for employer size when the
employer has a history of serious violations. Another fix would be to eliminate reductions that
reward the employer for doing what it should
already be required to do—bring its operations into compliance with the law. For example,
states could abandon reductions for “cooperating” with the agency, and for quickly fixing
hazards.47 After all, drivers cannot get a reduced
fine on a speeding ticket by politely promising
the officer that they will pay their ticket within
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n Higher gravity-based penalties for
serious violations
For each violation, Fed-OSHA selects a baseline penalty from which other reductions are
applied. Known as the “gravity-based penalty,”
it is tied to the severity of the hazard involved
and the probability that an injury or illness will
result. The gravity-based penalty is only set at
the statutory maximum in limited cases where
there is a heightened probability of injury from
a high-severity hazard. Fed-OSHA’s new penalty policy increased the gravity-based penalties
for all other serious violations. For example, the
gravity-based penalty for the lowest-gravity serious violation is now $3,000 instead of $1,500.

n An extended look-back period for
prior violations
Limited agency resources mean that employers
do not often see OHS inspectors, so if agencies
consider an employer’s history over too short
a period of time, the data will be sparse and
misleading. Fed-OSHA now looks for violations over the past five years (the old look-back
period was three years).
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n Limited penalty reductions for
medium-sized employers
Fed-OSHA does not allow size-based penalty
reductions for employers with more than 250
employees. The 2010 penalty policy also limited
reductions for employers with 26-250 employees,
allowing no more than a 30-percent reduction.

Challenges

n Serial, rather than summed,
reductions
Fed-OSHA now applies the size, history, and
good faith reductions one after another, rather
than summing the percentages together and
reducing the gravity-based penalty by the total
percentage. As a result, the cumulative effect of
the reductions is diminished.
Although Fed-OSHA recommended that states
adopt similar reforms to their penalty calculation policies, only two states (Nevada and
Wyoming) have done so as of this writing.
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Advocates should argue that the states that have
not adopted these administrative changes do
not have a program that is “at least as effective”
as Fed-OSHA, a requirement established by
the OSH Act.48 Advocates could press this point
and urge state policymakers to match or exceed
Fed-OSHA’s policies.

If history is any guide, the business community
will strongly resist any effort to increase fines,
framing the issue as one of severe government
overreach. They will likely argue that the new
penalty ranges and mandatory minimums will
strain already struggling businesses, require
them to cut jobs, and prevent economic growth.
Advocates can counter this rhetoric by focusing on the high rate of workplace injuries and
fatalities that have gone undeterred by existing
penalties and on the massive disparity between
outdated OSH Act penalties and the much more
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severe penalties available for environmental
and financial violations.
Mandatory minimums for particular kinds of
hazards are likely to be especially controversial,
with some industries claiming to have been
unfairly targeted for high penalties. In deciding
which hazards are appropriate for mandatory
minimums, advocates should select ones that
will resonate with the public and policymakers.
Even the business community should be able
to agree that certain kinds of violations are so
obviously dangerous that only truly bad actors
would allow them to occur, and that the only
response that stands a chance of deterring bad
actors would be the guarantee of a severe penalty in every case.
Advocates may also face strong opposition
from the state agencies themselves. Most of
the state-plan states objected when Fed-OSHA
recommended in 2010 that they adopt the
new methods for calculating penalties. They
disagreed with the wisdom of increasing civil
penalties, arguing that it would lead employers
to challenge citations and penalties much more
frequently.49 But that argument, taken to its logical conclusion, suggests that civil penalties must
be kept so low that employers find them virtually
unobjectionable—not worth contesting, and by
the same token, not high enough to deter future
violations. Avoiding lengthy legal challenges is
no excuse for maintaining inadequate penalties.
Instead, states should consider ways to reform
their appeals process to prevent employers from
wasting state resources on frivolous challenges
and ensure that legitimate challenges are heard
and resolved promptly.
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Small business associations and OHS agencies
may complain that even modestly increasing
penalty amounts will adversely impact small
employers, since large businesses are better able to absorb even the highest amounts.
But employers do not have a license to ignore
worker safety standards just because they are
“small,” and penalty amounts are so low that
they fail to deter some small businesses from
violating the law. A worker who may be killed
on the job does not care if his employer is a
small business or a Fortune 500 company.

Examples
Several states have set mandatory minimum
penalties for violations that cause or contribute
to a worker’s death. For example, Virginia’s
OHS program does not permit any penalty reductions for such violations; instead, it automatically assesses the maximum allowable penalty
in all cases: $7,000 for a serious violation and
$70,000 for a willful or repeat violation.50 In
2010, the Minnesota legislature adopted a law
that set minimum non-negotiable penalties for
fatality cases: $25,000 for a serious violation
and $50,000 for a willful or repeat violation.51
Minnesota also has a mandatory minimum
penalty of $25,000 for all willful violations by
employers with more than 50 employees.52
Some states already impose mandatory minimum penalties for violations related to certain
kinds of hazards. For instance, California applies a $140,000 penalty, which is not subject
to any adjustment, for serious or willful repeat
violations of any crane standard.53
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Expanded Criminal Liability: Treating Egregious
Workplace Deaths, Injuries, and Violations Like the
Crimes They Are
Problem
OHS agencies’ enforcement cases almost never
lead to criminal charges, even though many
cases exhibit the basic characteristics that, in
any other setting, would be considered criminal acts. If you run down a child while driving
drunk, you are prosecuted in a criminal court.
The consequences should be no less severe
when a boss sends a worker to the edge of a
rooftop without a harness. An average of 40
workers are killed each year after falling from
residential roofs, despite how easily preventable
such incidents are. Fatal falls and many other
workplace deaths are no different from the
cases of reckless homicide or involuntary manslaughter that fill local courts’ dockets—the only
distinction is that they occur on the job.
The prospect of criminal liability can have
a uniquely powerful deterrent effect against
employers who put their workers at risk. No
company wants to face the stigma of criminal
investigation and prosecution (which is often
more damaging than the fines), and nothing
scares individual bad actors like the thought of
time in prison. But so far, employers have had
little reason to worry: Prosecutors seldom pursue
criminal penalties for OHS misconduct, except
perhaps in the most extreme cases.
Such prosecutions are so rare that the Department of Justice, which handles criminal cases
for the federal OHS agencies, sent shockwaves
through the legal world when it announced it
was opening investigations into the disasters at
Massey’s Upper Big Branch mine and BP’s Gulf
spill drilling site. Both cases offered copious evidence of systemic corporate dysfunction and a
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degree of callousness toward worker safety that
all but demanded ambitious criminal charges
against the companies and several mid-level
managers. But it remains to be seen whether
prosecutors will be able to pursue indictments
against the high-level managers and executives
who drove their companies to catastrophe, since
the dearth of previous criminal cases under the
federal OHS statutes leaves many legal issues
unclear. The fact that it takes this kind of massive tragedy to pique the Justice Department’s
interest in prosecuting employers following
worker deaths underscores the various legal
obstacles that make it difficult to pursue criminal
penalties:

n High bar to filing charges
Under the OSH Act and most state plans, prosecutors may only file criminal charges for violations classified as “willful,” and only in cases
in which the willful violation led to a worker’s
death. A willful classification requires prosecutors to produce a great deal of evidence to show
that the employer acted either with intentional
disregard of the requirements of the law or with
plain indifference to employee safety.

n Inadequate prison terms and fines
The OSH Act and most state-plan OHS laws
only allow judges and juries to impose a maximum prison term of just six months for a first
conviction, or one year for additional convictions. In most state-plan states, the crimes are
deemed misdemeanors, with felony convictions
barred by the law. In addition, the maximum
fines available under state-plan OHS laws are
often trivial and out of date. In 1984, Congress
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standardized OSH Act fines to be in line with
penalties for other federal offenses, resulting in
maximum fines of up to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations.54 But many
state-plan OHS laws still reflect the original limits specified in the 1970 OSH Act: $10,000 for
a first conviction and $20,000 for subsequent
ones.

n Legal hurdles to prosecuting
corporations for manslaughter
A criminal prosecution for manslaughter (the
unintentional killing of a person resulting from
recklessness or criminal negligence) carries the
moral condemnation of the community and can
permanently damage a company’s reputation
and financial standing, all of which offer additional deterrence value. Often, when a worker
dies on the job, the corporation itself deserves
to be criminally prosecuted for manslaughter, apart from any charges brought against
its individual executives or managers.55 Many
workplace deaths are the result of underlying
corporate policies and practices that put profit
over protection and create conditions of unacceptable risk—for example, relentless demands
for faster and cheaper work, poor training and
supervision, and “siloed” management structures that spread decision-making authority so
thin among multiple actors that no one is accountable. But the existing framework of criminal law makes such prosecution exceedingly
difficult. Courts in some jurisdictions are still
hesitant to conclude that corporations can be
held liable under manslaughter statutes. More
importantly, restrictive ideas of legal causation
may prevent courts from finding the necessary
link between the corporation’s misconduct and
the sequence of events that directly resulted in
the death.56 Corporate prosecutions tend to be
skewed toward small businesses, where chains
of authority are easier to identify.57
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Solution: Expand the scope of
criminal liability and set steeper
penalties
State legislatures in state-plan
states should update their OHS
laws to strengthen criminal sanctions in three ways. First, criminal
penalties should be available to prosecutors not
only for hard-to-prove willful violations in fatality cases, but also for knowing and negligent
violations in cases where the violation has the
potential to cause death or serious injury. Most
OSH Act violations classified as “serious” would
be eligible for criminal prosecution under the
knowing-or-negligent standard. To establish a
serious violation of the law, Fed-OSHA bears
the burden of proving that an employer either
knew or could have known, with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of the physical circumstances that violate the Act. This standard tracks
the well-established concept of negligence in
criminal law, which requires prosecutors to show
that the defendant failed to take the level of
care that a reasonably prudent person would
take in the same circumstances. Second, the
strongest criminal penalties should be available
not just when the violation causes a death, but
also when it causes serious bodily harm. Such
misconduct should be deemed a felony, not a
misdemeanor, to reflect the seriousness of the
offense. Third, the maximum prison terms and
criminal fines available for OHS violations must
be substantially increased to effectively deter
bad actors and send prosecutors the message
that these cases are worth pursuing.
State legislators could accomplish these three
goals by establishing a criminal penalty structure with the following elements:58
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Criminal Sanctions Outside the OHS World
In contrast to OHS laws’ “willful” trigger for criminal liability, many environmental statutes extend criminal liability to “knowing” violations of the law that put a person in imminent danger
of death or serious harm. In that context, a “knowing” violation is one in which the defendant
was aware of the facts that constitute the violation—a conscious and informed action, as opposed to an accident or mistake—regardless of whether the defendant knew that the action
was actually against the law.
Maximum sentences under OHS laws pale in comparison to other laws that provide for 15-to30-year maximum sentences—even where no one directly lost his or her life—for mail fraud,
counterfeiting, and violations of certain environmental protection laws. Shipping illegallyobtained fish or plants across state lines can land someone in prison for five years—ten times
the maximum prison term for a willful OHS violation that kills a human being. (Lacey Act, 16
U.S.C. § 3373(d)(1))

n Knowing or willful violations that
cause or contribute to death or serious
bodily harm

subject to criminal fines of up to $5,000 per
violation. Organizations should be liable for
criminal fines of up to $10,000 per violation.

A felony conviction should be possible under
these circumstances, and the maximum prison
term should be 10 years if a worker dies or 5
years in the case of a worker suffering serious
bodily harm. Fines should also be on the table,
with a maximum of $250,000 per violation for
individuals. For organizations (including corporations), the maximum fines should be much
greater: up to $1.5 million for the first conviction; between $500,000 and $2.5 million per
violation if the organization had a previous
conviction for a knowing or negligent violation
that didn’t result in death or serious harm; and
between $1 million and $3.5 million per violation if it’s the organization’s second conviction
for the same crime in seven years.

n Repeat violations with the potential to
cause death or serious injury

n Negligent or knowing violations with
the potential to cause death or serious
injury

A misdemeanor conviction should be possible
here, and the maximum prison term should
be one year. Individuals should be subject to
criminal fines of up to $100,000 per violation.
Organizations should be liable for criminal fines
of up to $200,000 per violation.

n Knowingly making false statements
in documents submitted to an OHS
agency, or interfering with a fatality
investigation
A felony conviction should be possible for these
violations, and the maximum prison term should
be five years. Individuals should be subject to
criminal fines of up to $250,000. Organizations should be liable for criminal fines of up to
$500,000.

A misdemeanor conviction should be possible
in these cases, and the maximum prison term
should be six months. Individuals should be
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Solution: Corporate
manslaughter laws
State legislators in every state
could establish a “corporate
manslaughter law,” which would
make it significantly easier to hold
corporations criminally liable for the deaths of
their workers. Governments abroad are increasingly adopting such laws, and they have begun
to receive some attention in the United States,
as well.
While the laws vary in their design, an effective
proposal should include at least the following
essential elements:59

n Definition of the offense
Liability should result whenever a corporation
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes a
death through the conditions that it creates or
tolerates. One critical design choice will be how
high up the corporate ladder the jury must look
to find illegal conduct that can be attributed to
the corporation. The law should focus on the
conduct of owners and management officials
(with responsibilities across the organization or
within the particular business unit), but it could
also include the conduct of supervisors, perhaps
for a lesser-degree offense.

n Evidence
Because corporate misconduct takes many
forms, the law should permit consideration of
a broad range of evidence. First, juries should
examine the knowledge and conduct of individual actors who had a duty to communicate
information to others in the company. A particularly innovative approach would also consider
the “collective knowledge” of the corporation,
to account for the diffuse nature of information
and authority in modern corporations. Second, prior violations of OHS regulations could
be introduced to show the organization had
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been made aware of its dangerous conditions.
Third, the law should explicitly allow evidence of
“corporate culture” to be introduced—foreign
jurisdictions have defined this term to include
the corporation’s attitudes, policies, systems,
and accepted practices.

n Forms of punishment
The law should authorize not only heavy fines
(millions of dollars per death), but also a set
of flexible probationary orders that could be
tailored to address fundamental deficiencies in
the corporation’s management. Courts could
require corporations to submit to judicially
supervised restructuring, to institute an effective
OHS program with meaningful worker involvement, or to fund independent OHS research on
a subject related to the corporation’s misconduct.
Typically, corporate manslaughter laws cover
not only employee deaths, but also the deaths
of consumers and members of the general
public caused by corporations. So, advocates
should be able to garner additional support for
such a campaign from environmental, consumer, social justice, and other public interest
groups.

Challenges
The business community is sure to argue that
increasing criminal penalties would “over-deter”
corporate action, chilling legitimate business
conduct and increasing the costs of doing business, to the point of destroying industries or
forcing their relocation. Criminal sanctions, they
would say, impose a lasting stigma that companies are unable to shake off—and excessive
fines end up punishing people who did nothing
wrong, including shareholders who lose the
value of their stock, employees who might be
laid off, and consumers who have to pay higher
prices.
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Advocates can counter these specious economic
arguments by emphasizing that criminal penalties would only apply to employers that are truly
blameworthy—those that have clearly violated
legal and moral boundaries. Indeed, prosecutors will have to satisfy the most rigorous standard of proof (“beyond a reasonable doubt”)
in order to obtain a conviction, which helps to
ensure that criminal liability will be imposed
fairly and accurately.
Any resulting stigma is not an unfortunate byproduct to be avoided, but rather an intended
consequence of criminal punishment, showing society’s intense disapproval. If employers
become overly cautious about OHS, so much
the better—it would serve as a much-needed
counterweight to their strong profit incentives
to cut corners. The potential for extreme losses
will pressure shareholders to monitor corporate practices and demand improvements, and
consumer price increases will be limited by the
employer’s need to remain competitive.60
With respect to corporate manslaughter laws,
one of the biggest challenges may come after such a law is adopted: It will be necessary
to ensure that prosecutors aggressively take
advantage of the law’s new possibilities. Most
prosecutions under corporate manslaughter
laws in other countries still target relatively
small companies, convictions have been rare,
and the resulting fines are still small.61 To avoid
those problems in the United States, workers’
advocates will need to push for thorough fatality
investigations that can facilitate corporate manslaughter prosecutions by, for instance, encouraging greater scrutiny of “corporate culture”
(see recommendations later in this manual).

Examples: Broader criminal
liability and steeper penalties
Among state-plan states, California has the
broadest framework for criminal penalties: It
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extends misdemeanor liability to knowing and
negligent violations of OHS standards, provides for high corporate fines, and permits up
to four years in prison for repeat willful violations. Other noteworthy state-plan states include
Arizona (also criminalizes knowing violations),
Minnesota (permits criminal penalties for any
willful or repeat violation, regardless of whether
an employee died), Puerto Rico (permits prison
sentences of up to four-and-a-half years for a
second conviction), and Michigan (prison sentences of up to three years for a second conviction).
In 2006, an Indiana state lawmaker introduced
a widely discussed bill that would have authorized, among other things, a set of new criminal
penalties against managers, corporate officers,
and members of boards of directors who violate
OHS rules—not as ambitious as the penalty
framework proposed above, but nevertheless
very significant. Under the bill, reckless, knowing, and intentional violations resulting in serious bodily injury would be misdemeanors, punishable by up to one year in prison. Violations
resulting in death would be felonies, punishable
by imprisonment up to three years (for reckless
violations) or eight years (for knowing or intentional violations).62

Examples: Corporate
manslaughter laws
The United Kingdom adopted a new system in
2007 for corporate manslaughter that shares
many of the features discussed above, although
several of its standards are harder to satisfy:
Unlike the model law given above, the United
Kingdom law (1) requires a “gross breach” (conduct more extreme than ordinary negligence)
and (2) requires the involvement of “senior
management.”63 As of early 2014, prosecutors
had obtained only five convictions under the
law. However, use of the law may be accelerat-
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ing: Corporate manslaughter cases increased
by 40 percent from 2011 to 2012, and the last
four convictions all occurred within the past two
years.64 Similar reforms have recently been adopted in Canada and in the Australian Capital
Territory.65
The 2006 Indiana bill mentioned above would
also have authorized charges of corporate
manslaughter against organizations for reckless,

knowing, and intentional violations of workplace
OHS rules. However, it did not allow for the use
of new kinds of evidence (such as evidence of
corporate culture or collective knowledge), and
it did not provide for new forms of corporate
punishment.66 The bill has been re-introduced
several times (most recently in 2012) but so far
has not made it past committee.

Killed on the Job: A Criminal Act
On July 28, 2010, the lives of Catherine Rylatt and her family changed forever. That was the
day her nephew, Alex Pacas, was buried alive in a grain storage bin in rural Illinois. Alex, 19,
had taken a summer job with his friends Wyatt Whitebread, 14, Chris Lawton, 15, and Will
Piper, 20 at a corn storage facility run by Haasbach LLC in Mt. Carroll, Illinois. The boys did
various tasks around the facility, including entering the massive grain storage bins to break
up large chunks of rotten corn so that it could flow freely toward the mechanisms that transfer corn out of the bins. The most dangerous way to do this, often called “walking down the
grain,” involves climbing atop the grain while equipment is running and the grain is moving.
Fed-OSHA regulations prohibit walking down the grain because the practice is so dangerous.
Regulations also require employers to provide workers with special training and equipment
before entering grain storage bins.
Alex and the other boys had received just five minutes of “instruction” before beginning their
jobs and were never informed about the safety harnesses and lifelines that sat dusty in a
storage shed a few yards away from the scene. Not long after they began walking down the
grain, three of the boys felt the corn give way beneath them. As Wyatt sank below the surface, Alex tried to save him, only to be pulled under himself. With his last breaths before the
corn filled his lungs, Alex recited the Lord’s Prayer and told his friends about his wish to see
his brothers graduate high school.
Fed-OSHA investigators cited Haasbach for a dozen willful violations that led directly to the
boys’ deaths, yet the Department of Justice declined to file criminal charges. Alex’s aunt, like
many other family members who lose loved ones to workplace tragedies, was shocked to
learn that Fed-OSHA’s approach to enforcement is, in essence, “an administrative process—it
is not about the victims.”
Thousands of other children take on part-time farming jobs every year, working for employers
who often treat them as if they have knowledge and maturity beyond their years. Safety is not
always the first order of business, and enforcement agencies that fail to take strong actions
against employers who violate the law only exacerbate the problem. “A stronger message”
notes Rylatt, “would be sent by actions from the criminal justice system.”
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Shaming Scofflaw Employers and Industries:
Using Government Data Effectively
Problem

Solution

Convincing legislators to strengthen civil and
criminal penalties is difficult work, and it generally requires sustained advocacy over long
periods of time. For that reason, it is useful
for advocates to also use short-term tactics to
penalize employers who put workers at risk.
Because many companies go to great lengths
to cultivate a positive public image, the effective
use of “shaming”—bringing attention to businesses’ acts of wrongdoing—can push companies to improve their practices and fulfill their
legal duty to provide a safe and healthy workplace. Public pressure through shaming is especially important because the weak enforcement
tools available to OHS agencies have insufficient deterrent effect on their own. Educating the
public and policymakers about the worker safety
and health records of particular companies (or
even entire industries, such as construction or
agriculture) can also help bring needed attention to more general worker health and safety
problems, thus spurring needed reforms.

Workers’ advocates can enhance
their shaming campaign efforts by familiarizing themselves
with available government data
sources and by understanding those sources’
strengths and weaknesses. Statistics from the
data sources can then help advocates convince
policymakers, the media, and allied advocacy
organizations to address workplace health and
safety issues.

Information about the health and safety records
of employers and dangerous industries can help
advocates pressure employers to improve, and
can strengthen campaigns for stronger worker
protection laws. Too often, however, available
OHS data are difficult to find, are of questionable accuracy or reliability, or are presented in
ways that make them difficult to use effectively.
As a result, these data often are under-utilized
by advocates, the media, and policymakers for
informing and influencing policy debates to
strengthen OHS protections.
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Available OHS data sources include:

n The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
(CFOI)67
The annual CFOI compiles a range of data on
all fatal work-related injuries, including demographic data in aggregate form on the victims
(e.g., the percentage of victims in each gender,
age range, and occupational category). The
CFOI also provides aggregate information on
the industries involved, nature of the injuries
(e.g., fall from height, struck by equipment, and
asphyxiation). BLS presents some of the data in
charts and graphs to help users identify trends
in specific industries and occupations. Some
of the data can be queried to allow users to
customize reports to support their campaigns.
BLS fails to make the companies’ and victims’
names available, even though the agency has
that information, and even though it is a matter of public record. Another problem is that the
CFOI fails to include data on deaths from workrelated diseases.

Winning Safer Workplaces: A Manual for State and Local Policy Reform

n BLS Survey of Occupational Illness and
Injury (SOII)68
The SOII attempts to provide an annual estimate of injury and illness cases and rates by
industry classification codes. The SOII data are
not an actual count, though, since the vast majority of employers are not required to submit
their injury and illness records to BLS or OHS
agencies. Instead, the SOII estimate is generated by a sample of employer-provided injury
and illness records. BLS’s annual SOII report
provides the estimated number of cases, nature
of the injuries (e.g., burns and amputations),
severity (based on days of restricted duty or lost
time), and demographics on the injured or ill
workers (e.g., gender and age range), as well
as injury and illnesses rates to assist with comparisons between industries. As with the CFOI,
the SOII can only be used to identify industrywide and occupation-based trends. In addition
to these limitations, well-conducted studies on
the validity of SOII reveal that it undercounts
injury and illness records by as much as 25 to
68 percent.69 This is mainly because BLS gets its
information from only a sample of employers,
and relies on those employers to truthfully selfreport on the injuries their workers experience.

n Fed-OSHA Reports of Fatalities and
Catastrophes70
During the Obama Administration, Fed-OSHA
began posting on its website initial reports of fatalities in which OHS agencies intend to conduct
post-fatality inspections. The weekly reports (and
annual summaries) give the date of the incident,
name of the employer, location of the incident
(city and state), and nature of the fatal injury. As
presented on Fed-OSHA’s website, the data are
neither searchable nor sortable. Not all fatal
work-related injuries are investigated; in fact,
the majority are not. Even with its limitations,
the weekly reports of fatalities and annual summaries include information that advocates may
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find useful for shaming campaigns. Groups
may want to join forces to push OHS agencies
to disclose more complete fatality information.

n MSHA Accident Reports, “Fatalgrams,”
Investigation Reports, and
Enforcement Data71
Within a week of a fatal injury involving a mine
worker, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) posts an initial report of a fatality
on its website. The notice includes information
about the mine site; employer and controlling
company; and the worker’s name, age, occupation, and years of experience. Information on other serious non-fatal and non-injury
incidents—for example, explosions, unintended
rock falls, and amputations—is also available on MSHA’s website. MSHA’s data retrieval
system gives the public access to mine-specific
data on each inspection conducted, including
the violation cited, a hyperlink to the specific
regulation at issue in the violation, the penalty
assessed, and the disposition (or result) of the
case. The system, however, is not designed to
search records by other factors, such as the
type or severity of the violation. Nevertheless,
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the volume and specificity of the enforcement
data made available to the public could be a
model for other OHS agencies. Even advocates
in “non-mining” localities may find these data
sources useful, since they cover workers at stone
quarries, which exist in nearly every county in
the United States.

n Washington State Summary
of Workplace Fatalities and
Hospitalizations72
Similar to the Fed-OSHA Reports on fatalities
and catastrophes, the State of Washington’s
OHS program posts a report called “Fatalities
Summaries,” which provides basic information
about deaths resulting from workplace injuries
and illnesses in the state. Both the fatalities and
the hospitalizations summaries include information about the company involved and a general
description of the incident. The hospitalizations
summaries are searchable by industry and incident type. The summaries have the same general strengths and weaknesses as the Fed-OSHA
reports. As the website warns, the summaries do
not present a complete list of all work-related
fatalities and hospitalizations that have occurred
in the state, and as such these data systematically understate the extent of many of Washington’s workplace hazards.

n Tennessee Work Related Fatality
Investigations73
On its website, Tennessee OSHA provides narratives for all of the fatality investigations it has
conducted. (The agency updates the list annually, although resource constraints have delayed
the posting of narratives for 2013 fatalities.)
Each narrative provides a brief description
of the incident, some basic details about the
worker killed, and citations that Tennessee
OSHA issued as a result of the investigation.
Significantly, the narratives leave the employer
unidentified. Another weakness of this source is
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that the investigation records are not presented
as a searchable database.

n Wyoming Fatal Accident Alerts74
The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services
(DWS) posts alerts with brief summaries of onthe-job deaths and what the agency found while
investigating these incidents. Like Tennessee
OSHA, DWS posts incident descriptions without
naming employers and does not have a searchable database. In addition, it has not posted
new items since 2012. The DWS narratives list
“Significant Factors” and “Recommendations”
that can help other employers improve workplace safety.

n Fed-OSHA’s Severe Violator
Enforcement Program (SVEP)75
Beginning in 2010, Fed-OSHA began to designate some particularly recalcitrant employers
as “severe violators.” The agency’s criteria set
a very high bar for an employer to receive the
“severe violator” designation, such as repeat
violations for certain standards and violations
classified as willful. Fed-OSHA posts quarterly
the names of the companies that have been
designated “severe violators” and any enforcement actions against them.76 Fed-OSHA has
also directed state-plan states to create SVEPlike programs. To date, 17 of the 27 state-plan
states have adopted programs identical or
similar to Fed-OSHA’s SVEP. 77

n Fed-OSHA’s Occupational Safety and
Health Information System (OIS)78
OIS is a tool that allows the public to search the
enforcement histories of companies that have
been subject to an OHS agency inspection. The
search results provide information about each
individual inspection, including the employer
involved, the regulation violated, and any resulting citations and penalties. For inspections
conducted by Fed-OSHA, the search results also

Winning Safer Workplaces: A Manual for State and Local Policy Reform

provide a hyperlink for each citation to the text
of the health or safety standard that was violated. While advocates can use the OIS records
data for shaming scofflaw employers, they have
important limitations. OIS does not allow users to
search or sort key data points—such as types of
violations or penalty amounts—and that makes
it difficult to draw broader conclusions about
trends in workplace hazards. It does not provide
information on whether the company has multiple worksites or is part of a larger corporate
entity or conglomerate. The data can also be
unreliable if the name of the company in the
database is even slightly different than the name
used by the individual doing the search (e.g.,
U.S. Steel Company instead of US Steel, Inc.).

n Department of Labor (DOL)
Enforcement Database79
The DOL Enforcement Database pulls data
from Fed-OSHA and MSHA data systems, as
well as other U.S. Department of Labor enforcement agencies. It is organized and presented in
a different format than Fed-OSHA’s and MSHA’s
individual databases, and has more options to
search and download the data.
Advocates may want to explore other data
sources in their state—such as online business
records databases maintained by state records
offices—which might provide additional information on the health and safety histories of
individual firms.
Where appropriate, advocates should consider
employing shaming campaigns that make effective use of OHS data. Depending on how
they are used, these data sources can help
illustrate the extent of inexcusable workplace
hazards and provide concrete instances of how
particular hazards have harmed workers. These
sources can add persuasive force to advocates’
campaigns for tough enforcement actions
against a scofflaw employer or for stronger
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worker protection laws or standards, or for
policies that bar purchasing or contracting with
employers that have shameful records.

Challenges
Business groups have argued shaming campaigns unfairly stigmatize companies and
industries. They say the campaigns inhibit their
ability to conduct business and, as a result,
harm the economy. In particular, they argue
that such campaigns improperly lead people to
conclude that particular companies or industries
do not adequately protect the health and safety
of their workers, and they will insist they are not
at fault. Many companies are quick to blame
workers for their injuries, assert that “accidents
happen,” and continue to do so long after the
incident.
Without allowing the power of their messaging
about injured workers to be undercut by debating such criticisms, advocates can respond
by pointing out that employers themselves are
well-positioned to avoid such risks by maintaining safe workplaces and by properly educating
others about their worker health and safety
records, if indeed their records can withstand
scrutiny.
Separately, because of the limitations noted
above, groups may encounter policymakers and
reporters who don’t regard injury rates of a firm
or industry as being particularly high. Advocates
may face challenges in explaining the limitations of the data, such as its reliance on self-reported injury-and-illness rates given by employers, and the fact that most workplaces never get
a Fed-OSHA inspection. Some advocates may
find that injury or illness records might actually undercut advocacy efforts, since these data
understate injury rates. In any event, advocates
should refer to the limitations in available OHS
data as part of their efforts to push OHS agencies to disclose more information about worker
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fatalities, such as the victims’ names, along
with a link to the related inspection records and
resulting citations. In addition, advocates can
focus not just on the data, but on the stories underlying the data—stories of individual workers
hurt and killed on the job.

Examples
Several advocacy organizations and investigative journalists are already making effective use
of existing OHS data sources to shame scofflaw
employers or bring attention to particular hazards in inadequately regulated industries.
For example, members of the Fe y Justicia
Worker Center have been engaged in a multiyear effort to address wage theft in the Houston,
Texas. They recognize that some employers’
labor-law abuses not only involved wage and
hour violations, but also workplace health and
safety hazards. The worker center reviewed
Fed-OSHA’s list of “Severe Violators” and
identified at least one company with an egregious record of repeat violations that also had
a record of wage theft. Worse still, the firm had
a longstanding contract with the city of Houston for excavation projects and was receiving
an average payment of $1 million per month.
The worker center collaborated with a local
television reporter to expose the misdeeds. The
worker center will be using this case, along with
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others, in its efforts to get Houston to adopt a
responsible-contractor ordinance.
United Support & Memorial for Workplace
Fatalities (USMWF), a group of family members
whose loved ones have suffered fatal workrelated injuries, use OHS agency data in their
advocacy activities. Fed-OSHA’s OIS database
provides information on whether post-fatality
inspections resulted in any violations and the
monetary penalties assessed with them. In some
cases, the penalties paid have been as low as
$1,500. USMWF uses this information to shame
OHS agencies for penalties reductions, and
to fight, for example, for changes to raise the
penalty maximums.
Investigative journalists, nurses, and other
patient-care professionals have used BLS’s SOII
data to draw attention to the high rates of musculoskeletal injuries among health care professionals. These data have aided the push for
state-based “safe patient handling” programs
to ensure that nurses and other health care
professionals have the appropriate tools, procedures, and training to lift and move patients
safely. Nine states—California, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Texas, and Washington—now require
that health care facilities have comprehensive
programs to ensure safe patient handling.80
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Chapter 3: Strengthening
Institutions

I

n this section, we discuss how states can
institutionalize the structures and procedures necessary to effectively pursue
criminal cases against employers who violate
OHS standards and to improve occupational
fatality investigations. We also describe
how government contracting procedures
and local oversight of building codes are
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underutilized means of protecting workers.
We conclude with a recommendation that
state-plan states conduct independent audits
of their OHS agencies’ work, which may
provide advocates and state legislators with
valuable information about how to improve
the agencies’ functioning.
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Systematic Criminal Enforcement:
Ensuring that Police and Prosecutors Prioritize
Workplace Health and Safety
Problem
Aside from the legal hurdles and inadequate
penalties that make it difficult to hold employers
criminally responsible for OHS incidents (addressed above), states lack the infrastructure to
ensure that such cases are properly pursued.
Workplace tragedies typically fall through the
cracks of a criminal enforcement system that is
preoccupied with guns and drugs. At an institutional level, prosecutors and law enforcement
are not adequately engaged in the investigation of workplace fatalities and serious injuries.
They generally lack both the training and the
incentive to identify evidence that could suggest
criminal wrongdoing by an employer. Instead,
they too often view these potential crimes as
blameless “accidents” and cede the investigation to the OHS agency.
The investigative follow-up to 23-year-old Erik
Deighton’s death exemplifies the disregard that
law enforcement officials often show for occupational fatalities. Deighton was crushed inside a
plastic molding machine when it cycled on while
he was attempting to clear an obstruction. Any
number of employer failures may have contributed directly to this incident—hazardous work
methods, a lack of safety training, or a lack of
safeguards that guarantee the machine will not
turn on while being serviced—many of which
could rise to the level of criminal culpability. The
response of local law enforcement, however,
was sadly typical: After conducting a preliminary
investigation and finding no evidence of a traditional “crime,” the police concluded that it fell
under the jurisdiction of the state OHS agency.
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“We’re done with it,” said the police captain.
“It’s an unfortunate accident.”81
Incident investigations by agency inspectors
typically lack the rigor and quality of a criminal
investigation conducted by police and prosecutors, in terms of gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. Also, OHS agency investigations tend to focus too narrowly on finding
technical violations of regulatory standards,
instead of examining the root causes of the
incidents. While OHS agencies can refer a case
to a local prosecutor (or, in Fed-OSHA’s case,
to the Department of Justice) if they think the
office may be able to charge the employer with
a criminal offense, referrals are rare due to the
perceived difficulty of building a winning case
and a lack of institutional motivation to try.

Solution
Sporadic criminal investigations
and occasional prosecutions are
insufficient to deter fatalities and
injuries. Instead, criminal investigation and prosecution should be made regular components of state and local responses
to workplace incidents and serious violations.
Achieving that will require states to institutionalize the structures and procedures necessary to
pursue these cases.
First, in state-plan states, state law should
require OHS agency inspectors to immediately
notify local prosecutors whenever they learn of a
workplace fatality or serious injury. Because the
criminal penalty system suggested earlier in this
manual would enable misdemeanor charges
for virtually all serious violations, even where
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no one was injured, state-plan OHS agencies
should devise a clear set of rules for deciding
which of these violations to refer for possible
prosecution. Perhaps agencies could focus on
hazards that have been difficult to deter by
other means (e.g., those that should be subject
to mandatory-minimum civil penalties, as suggested earlier in this manual), or violations that
exposed workers to particularly grave hazards
or made it very likely that workers would be
harmed. However, these referrals may not have
much of an impact if local prosecutors have
little experience in such incidents or lack the
institutional motivation to investigate them.
A more ambitious structural reform, in either
Fed-OSHA or state-plan jurisdictions, would be
to establish an OHS section within the state or
local prosecutor’s office, similar to the “environmental crimes” sections found in many
jurisdictions. This permanent, specialized unit
would ensure that workplace fatalities, injuries, and serious violations do not get lost or
ignored among all the other crimes considered
by prosecutors. The attorneys and investigators
assigned to the OHS section would, over time,
develop expertise in these kinds of cases. The
OHS section should be responsible for training
law enforcement officials on how to investigate
workplace incidents with an eye toward potential criminal prosecution.
Ideally, a deputy district attorney and an investigator from the office should be on call 24 hours
a day to respond to reports of workplace fatalities or serious injuries. Once at the worksite,
they would be responsible for directing the collection of all physical and testimonial evidence
that might be useful in building a criminal case,
in cooperation with the law enforcement officers
on the scene.
Because most prosecutors are likely to be found
in major cities, advocates may wish to campaign for an “OHS circuit prosecutor” program
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to ensure equally effective enforcement in
less-populated areas. The state would provide
funding for a small team of roaming prosecutors to help crack down on workplace incidents
and violations in rural areas, where local district
attorneys typically lack the resources and expertise to prosecute anything but standard criminal
cases.
Advocates can work with local lawmakers to
require police departments to investigate all
workplace fatalities as potential cases of manslaughter or reckless homicide, and in each
case provide a written report to the OHS agency
explaining whether such charges are appropriate. This requirement would ensure that police
officers no longer view such fatalities as “just
accidents.” Work-related fatalities should not be
viewed by law enforcement as distinct from all
other deaths—exclusively under the jurisdiction
of regulatory agencies—simply because they
occur on the job.

Challenges
Efforts to institutionalize a strong response to
workplace fatalities, injuries, and other serious
violations will face a number of challenges.
Foremost among them will be social and cultural issues. The notion that workplace deaths
are merely unfortunate “accidents” is so deeply
entrenched that many communities may bristle
at the thought of prosecutors treating wellregarded business owners like criminals. Circuit
prosecutors brought in from other areas may be
dismissed as outsiders, with no understanding
of rural or industrial life.
Political pressure may also threaten these programs. If the company responsible for a fatality
is a significant contributor to local political campaigns and/or one of the area’s major employers, prosecutors may face intense pressure from
up their chain of command to drop the case.82
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Resource constraints will also be a challenge.
Creating an OHS section in the local prosecutor’s office is likely to be a tough sell when state
and local budgets are stretched thin, so advocates will need to make great efforts to raise the
profile of workplace fatalities.

Examples
The best model for institutionalizing criminal
enforcement is the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office, which pioneered most of the
reforms suggested above. In 1984, it became
the first local prosecutor’s office in the country
to establish a section devoted to OHS-related
crimes. The office then began educating law
enforcement on techniques for investigating
workplace fatalities by holding seminars and
distributing training tapes.83
The office’s practice of conducting its own workplace investigations led to much more frequent
criminal charges in L.A. County—brought in
about 10 to 20 percent of all occupational
fatalities—than in other counties where prosecu-
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tors relied on case referrals from Cal/OSHA,
California’s state-plan OHS agency.84 Utilizing
its statutory authority, the office also filed charges for a number of serious violations where the
risk of death was particularly high, even though
no one had been injured (e.g., an “unshored”
18-foot-deep trench that had not collapsed).85
Several other institutional innovations were
also introduced in California. It is one of only a
handful of states that require safety inspectors
to automatically notify prosecutors of workplace
fatalities.86 Cal/OSHA includes a criminal Bureau of Investigations, which is made up largely
of former police officers. And in 2001, California initiated a Circuit Prosecutor Project to help
pursue criminal charges for workplace deaths in
rural areas. Despite bringing several trailblazing
cases, the small project faced intense resistance
from judges and communities and was ultimately terminated.87 A separate circuit project
for environmental crimes is still in operation and
would serve as a useful model for worker safety
advocates.88
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Robust Fatality Investigations: Ensuring
Effective Responses to Workplace Deaths
Problem
Investigations of work-related fatalities by OHS
agencies are not typically conducted with the
depth, diligence, transparency, and family
participation that the situations warrant. These
problems prevent agencies from identifying the
multiple factors that led to a fatality, holding the
employer properly accountable, and gathering
information that can lead to new rules to help
prevent future incidents.
First, OHS fatality investigations often do not
begin until many hours or even days after the
death occurs. Under Fed-OSHA regulations—
and virtually all the state plans as well—employers have up to eight hours to notify the agency
of a work-related fatality or an incident causing
hospitalization of three or more employees.89 In
other words, employers have ample time to disturb the “scene of the crime,” whether intentionally (by hiding evidence of a safety violation) or
inadvertently (by cleaning up the area in order
to allow work to continue). Employers can use
that time to discuss the incident with the victim’s
co-workers, intimidate them from speaking to
investigators, or make them doubt their own
recollections. Aside from any employer influence, witnesses may begin to forget crucial
details if their statements are not taken immediately after the incident.
Second, when OHS agency inspectors show up
to a fatality scene, their focus is too narrow. The
goal of these investigations is typically limited
to assessing the working conditions that immediately led to the fatality, with an emphasis on
uncovering citable violations. Often, a worker’s
death is the result of practices, policies, or
management system failures that increase OHS
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risks, a link that can only be identified through
a comprehensive examination of the incident’s
root causes. These failures may include inadequately controlled hazards like a lack of
sufficient training, language barriers, ineffective
maintenance of equipment, worker fatigue, or
a culture that emphasizes speed and production
over worker safety. The more superficial analysis
typically conducted by OHS agencies is likely to
lead to changes in the workplace that fail to resolve root causes and thus leave workers vulnerable to future injuries and fatalities.
Third, victims’ families and other workers’
advocates often feel shut out by the opaque
investigation and settlement process carried out
by OHS agencies. In 2012, Fed-OSHA issued a
directive intended to improve communications
with victims’ families. Under the new policy,
Fed-OSHA contacts the family early in the process to obtain information that might be useful and to explain the process and timeline for
the investigation. Fed-OSHA is then supposed
to provide updates to the family, supply them
with copies of citations issued to the employer,
and explain the results once the investigation
is closed.90 But even with this new policy, family members still report being unable to obtain
access to any information in Fed-OSHA’s case
file (e.g., inspector’s notes, photographs, or
surveillance camera footage) until all litigation between the employer and the agency is
over, which is typically not until months or years
after the fatality occurred. And families often
feel their voices are not being heard, especially
when they learn—after the fact—that the agency
and its attorneys cut a deal with the employer in
settlement negotiations, with drastically reduced
penalties and downgraded violations.
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Solution: Ensure that evidence
is preserved

on improving communications with families, if it
has not done so already.91

Advocates in state-plan jurisdictions should consider campaigning for a law that requires quicker
reporting of workplace deaths.
Unions could also add such a requirement to
collective bargaining agreements. There is no
need for employers to be given an eight-hour
window to make a simple phone call to the state
agency. Employers should be required to report
a work-related fatality no later than 15 minutes
from the time they learn about it, or would have
learned about it with diligent inquiry. This reporting requirement should also be triggered by
incidents that cause serious bodily harm to one
or more employees, especially if such incidents
could potentially result in criminal liability under
the state’s law (one of the reforms we suggested
earlier in this manual). The short timeframe will
ensure that the agency has the best chance of
arriving at the scene while the physical evidence
is unchanged and the event is still fresh in witnesses’ minds.

But states should go significantly beyond that
directive. State-plan OHS agencies should be
required by law or regulation to give victims,
their families, and their representatives the right
to meet with the agency administrator to discuss
the investigation before the agency’s decision
to issue a citation or take no action. Families
should be informed within 24 hours of any
notice from the employer that it is contesting a
violation. They should be provided an opportunity to appear and make a statement in any
proceedings before the agency’s review commission. They should be notified of the date and
time of all proceedings and receive an explanation of their rights to participate in them, before
the agency enters into an agreement to modify
or withdraw a citation. Families should have an
opportunity to appear and make a statement
before (or send a letter to) the parties conducting settlement negotiations. Families should
also be notified that they can designate someone to be their representative with respect to
their communications with the agency and their
exercise of these rights.

Employers should be required to take all appropriate measures to prevent the destruction or
alteration of any evidence that might be useful
in an investigation. A violation of this requirement should be classified as a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison (similar to the
punishment for making false statements in OHS
documents suggested earlier in this manual), to
ensure executives and managers take it seriously.

Solution: Give victims and
their families a greater voice
As a first step, advocates in stateplan jurisdictions should consider
urging their state OHS agency to
adopt Fed-OSHA’s 2012 directive
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While some of these rights could potentially
be granted in an agency policy statement or a
regulation, cementing them in a law would be
the most enduring long-term solution.

Solution: Require a public
inquest into the circumstances
of workplace deaths
Advocates in both Fed-OSHA and
state-plan jurisdictions should
consider urging legislation at the
state or local level to require an
inquest for each workplace fatality. Among the
other benefits outlined below, inquests would
ensure detailed investigation of the management system failures and other “root causes”

Winning Safer Workplaces: A Manual for State and Local Policy Reform

that are often overlooked during fatality investigations performed by OHS enforcement agencies.
Historically, coroner’s inquests were routinely
held after an individual’s sudden or unexplained
death. The purpose of the inquest was not to
determine anyone’s culpability for the death, or
to assign civil or criminal liability, but rather to
determine the causes and circumstances of the
death. For the most part, the role of these inquests in the United States has been supplanted
by modern forensic science, with many states
converting from coroners to “medical examiners.” In other countries, however, inquests are
still common—and in some cases mandatory—
following workplace fatalities.
A public inquest would be an extremely useful
tool for improving the quality and transparency
of investigations into workplace fatalities, for a
number of reasons:

n Prompt factfinding
An inquest should be held as soon as possible—
and no later than six months—after the fatality. It would produce a detailed and definitive
account of the facts surrounding the worker’s
death. This account could be introduced in
subsequent civil lawsuits or criminal prosecutions, not as a showing of guilt or liability but as
a credible explanation of what happened.

n Transparency and publicity
The details of the worker’s death would be aired
in a public forum, permitting attendance by
the worker’s family and friends, as well as coworkers and members of the media. Attendees
would be able to see the evidence presented,
including inspector’s notes, photographs, and
video footage. The publicity surrounding an
inquest could also help bring attention to each
worker’s individual story and the inadequacies
of existing regulation.
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n Public participation
The inquest should be presided over by a local
magistrate or state court judge. The judge would
ultimately decide whom to call as witnesses, after
taking suggestions from various parties. At the inquest, witnesses could be questioned not only by
the judge, but by any interested parties, including
relatives (and representatives) of the deceased
worker. Local prosecutors, police officers, and
agency inspectors could be called to give testimony based on their observations. The evidence
would be heard by a jury of local residents,
which would ultimately deliver a factual account
of the fatality.

n Comprehensive analysis of the cause
If there was a history of dangerous practices or
“close calls” leading up to the fatality, or an attempt by other workers to bring attention to hazardous conditions, these facts would likely come
out in witness testimony and become part of
the factual account. This in-depth examination
would help to identify root causes of workplace
deaths and uncover dysfunctional corporate
cultures. Over time, a series of inquests would
produce a public record of deaths in particular
industries, allowing observers to identify trends
and patterns.

n Recommendations on record
An inquest jury can make recommendations
designed to prevent similar deaths in the future, including desirable changes to laws and
regulations. While they would be non-binding,
these recommendations would put employers,
lawmakers, and regulators officially on notice
about the changes that need to be made, which
would be increasingly difficult to ignore as incidents continue to occur.
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agency’s flexibility and delay the timely resolution of cases. However, none of those concerns
outweighs the family’s right to be heard in
review commission proceedings and settlement
negotiations. Most victims and family members have acquired a deep understanding of
the factors that contributed to the incident, and
they typically have valuable ideas for improving
worker protections that deserve to be considered. Family members consistently say that it
is too late to help their loved one and so their
greatest motivation is to see that the penalties
and interventions help to ensure that another
family does not have to endure the grief that
they have experienced.

Challenges
Advocates can expect varying levels of opposition to the solutions recommended above. Some
employers may argue that, in the aftermath of
a workplace fatality or serious injury, they have
responsibilities that are far more pressing than
quick reporting of the incident to a regulatory
agency. They may claim that their immediate
focus will be on calling and assisting emergency
services and dealing with distraught workers.
But those activities do not have to be done by
the same person. An employer can assign one
or more employees with the task of immediately
reporting the incident, or the person who calls
911 can also call the OHS agency. Also, the
reporting requirement is very minimal. All that
is required is a phone call giving the name of
the establishment, the time and location of the
incident, the names of affected employees, and
a brief description of what happened.92
Employers will likely oppose granting new rights
to victims and their family members on the
grounds that emotional victim statements may
unduly sway agency officials and decisionmakers at hearings. OHS agencies and their lawyers
are likely to be wary of granting these rights
as well, suggesting that they might hamper the
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The biggest challenge to creating a system of
public inquests is the novelty of such a process
in modern U.S. law. The public and policymakers may have misconceptions about the purpose
of the inquest and what it entails. States will
likely object to an increased workload for magistrates and judges. And employers will strongly
resist the idea of being questioned by victims’
families and other parties in a public forum.
Advocates will have to educate lawmakers on
the value of inquests in other countries, using
examples of reforms they have helped to bring
about, the increased transparency they provide,
and the great importance placed on them by
workers, their families, and the public.

Examples: Quick reporting
and evidence preservation
The most prominent example of a quick reporting requirement is found in federal mine safety
rules. Since 2006, the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act (Mine Act) and Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) regulations have
required mine operators to report to MSHA
within 15 minutes from the time they know or
should know that a reportable incident has
occurred. This requirement applies not only
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Killed at Work: Surviving Family Left in the Dark
Sherman Holmes spent nearly his entire life in and around rural Michigan’s stately forests.
He worked in the logging industry after graduating high school in the 1970s, and when he
moved on to a job as a bus driver and custodian for the local school system he spent his
off hours in the woods hunting and fishing. His love for the outdoors was so strong that he
went back to work in the logging industry after retiring from the school system. By that time,
though, things had changed. Holmes was especially surprised by his employer’s attitude
toward workplace safety. In the 1970s, he was issued a hardhat and wore it every day. When
he went to work for K & K Forest Products in 2010, the company told him they could not afford to provide him with a helmet.
On February 2, 2011, K & K sent Holmes and several other employees to fell groups of
clumped trees before an impending storm. Under pressure to get the work done, Holmes
and his co-workers were working quickly and close together—closer than OSHA regulations
allow. Tragically, one of the felled trees struck Holmes in the head and killed him before an
ambulance arrived on the scene.
Holmes’s daughter Danielle Dole recounts a stream of indignities following her father’s death
that exemplify the problems that might be addressed by improvements to OHS agency policies. No one called Danielle or the rest of Holmes’s family; they learned that he might be in
danger only after seeing a cryptic message on Facebook: “A Holmes was killed in the woods
today.” Frantic, they called various hospitals and the police station in search of details. No
representative from Michigan’s state-plan OHS agency (MIOSHA) reached out to the family,
who had to call several times to learn the status of the investigation into Holmes’s death. The
first contact the family had with anyone who had official knowledge of the incident was a call
from K & K’s insurance company, offering to issue them Holmes’s final paycheck. Later, when
the family went to collect a workers’ compensation payment, Danielle recalled that no one
could look them in the eye or give them any information about Holmes’s death.
MIOSHA fined K & K Forest Products $1,525 for Sherman Holmes’s death. Holmes’s daughter criticizes the small penalty, noting that the tree that killed her father garnered more than
$3,000 in profits for K & K. Dole is haunted by the way both the company and government
officials treated her father’s death. “Workers need advocates,” she says. “We have nobody
for us.”

to fatalities, but other serious injury incidents,
structural collapses, fires, and other very serious
events and close calls.93 An employer who fails
to meet the 15-minute deadline faces a penalty
between $5,000 and $65,000.94 The Mine Act
also contains provisions requiring the employer
to preserve evidence that would assist in an
investigation.95
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Examples: Giving victims and
their families a greater voice
The Protecting America’s Workers Act (PAWA)
bill proposed a broad set of victims’ rights
provisions, which forms the basis for the reforms
suggested above.96 Also, MSHA already requires the assignment of a family liaison in fatal
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mine incidents, as required by the 2006 MINER
Act,97 and MSHA meets with the victim’s family to explain any citations before the company
receives them.

Examples: Public inquests for
workplace fatalities
In England and Wales, coroner’s inquests are
held within six months of all workplace fatalities, since they are considered unnatural or
sudden deaths.98 And in Scotland, a unique
form of inquest called a “fatal accident inquiry”
is held after every workplace death—before a
judge, with no jury. A public prosecutor presents
evidence in the public interest, and other parties
can be represented as well.99
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Some provinces in Canada require a coroner’s
inquest for deaths in certain industries. In New
Brunswick, an inquest is mandatory whenever
someone dies at a “high-risk” workplace, such
as a woodland operation, sawmill, lumber
processing plant, food processing plant, fish
processing plant, construction project site, or
mining site.100 In Ontario, inquests are mandatory for all construction- and mining-related fatalities; a jury of six citizens hears the case and
can make recommendations to any entity. The
coroner cannot require the recommendations to
be adopted, but recommendations made to the
Ministry of Labor are evaluated by a legislative
committee that has the authority to adopt new
regulations. Workers’ advocates throughout
Canada have been fighting to require inquests
for all workplace deaths.101
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Responsible Contractor Laws: Holding
Government Contractors Accountable for Worker
Health and Safety
Problem
Without robust policies to ensure that their
contractors have effective OHS programs,
government agencies run the risk of subsidizing
construction firms that operate hazardous worksites. Agencies typically hire the lowest bidder,
so companies that cut corners on worker health
and safety on the assumption that it reduces
project costs may be rewarded with lucrative
government contracts. By failing to set a high
standard for worker safety in their public works
projects, state and local authorities are missing a major opportunity to reshape the market
and incentivize safer worksites throughout the
industry.
Construction is one of the most hazardous
industries for workers. Frequent injuries and
deaths from falls, electrocutions, and striking
objects impose unbearably high costs on individuals, families, and local economies. Public
Citizen estimates that, between 2008 and 2010,
fatal and nonfatal construction injuries cost the
states of Maryland $713 million, Washington
$762 million, and California $2.9 billion in
medical services, lost productivity, administrative
expenses, and lost quality of life.102
The firms responsible for many of these injuries
and fatalities, and those with histories of citations for unsafe practices, continue to receive
contracts from state and local governments.
For example, by early 2013 SER Construction
Partners had been repeatedly cited for serious,
repeat, and even willful violations of Fed-OSHA
standards for excavation and trenching, and
yet the company was still raking in $20 million
over a ten-month period from contracts with
the City of Houston, not to mention a slew of
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other Texas municipalities. And in late 2013,
after a 28-year-old worker named Angel Garcia died after falling four stories while working
on a large, publicly funded renovation project
at Texas A&M University, the company was
found to have violated Fed-OSHA’s demolition
standards. Just six months earlier, four workers
had been seriously injured on the same campus when a construction site collapsed; the two
companies responsible both had extensive rap
sheets of Fed-OSHA violations before being
hired to work on the university project.

Solution
Advocates should campaign for
legislation that would require state
and local agencies to consider a
bidder’s OHS policies and performance before awarding public contracts. Such
laws or ordinances could be enacted in both
state-plan and Fed-OSHA states. The most effective way to implement this requirement would
be through a prequalification process, in which
firms are not allowed to enter bids until they
pass a rigorous OHS evaluation. This requirement should apply to both general contractors
and subcontractors seeking to work on public
projects, to ensure that all the companies involved in managing the worksite pass muster.
The benefits of such a program, including
improved worker safety, increased productivity,
and lower insurance costs for employers, reach
far beyond public contracts, since companies
hoping to remain eligible for bidding would
have to maintain a good OHS record in all
their work—including projects done for private
clients.
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A committee of national experts has developed
a strong model bill, included in a series of
reports by Public Citizen, for state legislatures
to use in designing a prequalification system.103
The bill instructs the state labor department to
develop, in consultation with stakeholders, a
standardized questionnaire and rating system
for evaluating potential bidders on objective
criteria, including among other things:

n Planning
Employers should use written, site-specific OHS
plans.

n Leadership
Employers should demonstrate a commitment
by management to worker health and safety.

n Training
Employers should provide effective and regularly scheduled OHS training of workers and
supervisors, in a language and format that each
employee can understand.

n Employee participation
Employers should have policies that encourage
workers to report unsafe conditions and workrelated injuries. They should grant workers the
right to immediately stop working in hazardous
conditions.

n Compliance record
The rating system considers numerous aspects
of an employer’s compliance record, including: Fed-OSHA lost-time incident rates and
injury-and-illness rates; workers’ compensation
experience modification rates (EMRs, which reflect the number and value of a firm’s workers’
compensation claims, as compared to those of
other firms in the same industry); citations and
penalties by state and federal OHS agencies;
and stop-work orders issued for violating OHS
or other laws.
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n Other factors
The state labor department should consider any
other factors it finds useful in evaluating OHS
performance.
***
Building on this model bill, advocates may want
to consider pushing for additional disclosures,
such as: (1) records of any state or federal OHS
agency inspections, regardless of the outcome;
(2) copies of any settlement agreements with
agencies; (3) decisions issued by OHS review
commissions (or any other independent bodies that hear employers’ challenges to OHS
agency citations and penalties); and (4) records
of “close call” incidents that could have resulted
in worker injuries. Requiring potential bidders to
disclose five years’ worth of these items would
provide agencies with broader context for a
firm’s compliance history. Firms should also be
required to identify and submit any OHS policies they use that go beyond mere compliance
with specific Fed-OSHA or state-plan standards.
Also, bidders could be required to establish a
whistleblower protection policy and to supply
proof of workers’ compensation coverage. The
state department of labor should set a minimum
passing score for the questionnaire, and bidders
should have to undergo the evaluation at least
once a year to remain eligible.
Advocates may also want to urge legislators to
incorporate safety audits into the rating system. Insurance carriers often provide audits at
the employer’s request, in an effort to identify
potential OHS violations and hazards so the
employer can correct them before workers are
injured and file workers’ compensation claims,
or an OHS agency discovers them upon inspection and imposes penalties. While the information in these audits is much more valuable than
simple injury-and-illness statistics, requiring
employers to submit their recent safety audits as
part of the prequalification process could dis-
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States with Existing OHS Prequalification Programs
• California does not require agencies to adopt a prequalification system, but for those that
choose to, the state has developed a model questionnaire with scoring guidelines. (Cal.
Pub. Cont. Code § 20101; http://www.dir.ca.gov/od_pub/prequal/PubWksPreQualModel.
pdf)
• Massachusetts requires prequalification for contractors and subcontractors bidding on
projects costing $100,000 or more. A record of excessive safety violations or injuries found
to qualify for workers’ compensation may be cause for taking a company off the qualified
list. (810 CMR 9.00 et seq.)
• Connecticut requires prequalification for projects costing more than $500,000. (C.G.S. §
4a-100)
• Tennessee requires contractors (who have already been awarded contracts by the state’s
Department of Transportation) to certify that they have an effective Employee Safety and
Health Program before work can begin. (Tennessee Department of Transportation, Construction Division, Contractor Employee Safety and Health Program, http://www.tdot.state.
tn.us/construction/Safety_Health_Program/EmployeeSafetyandHealth.pdf)

courage employers from requesting the audits
in the first place. Instead, contractors should be
encouraged to submit any safety audits prepared in the past five years, along with information about any corrective actions they took in
response. The state’s prequalification scoring
system could give potential bidders credit both
for submitting the audits and for any corrective actions. This way, employers would have
new incentives to monitor for hazards and to fix
them when they are discovered.
Debarment, or prohibiting noncompliant
companies from receiving contracts, is another
critical issue. By creating the possibility that a
firm would be prohibited from bidding on or receiving government contracts, state legislatures
or local governments could establish significant
economic incentives for firms to improve their
health and safety programs. One justification
for debarment is to preserve the integrity of the
prequalification process. Prospective bidders
would have strong incentives to submit false

Chapter 3: Strengthening Institutions

records, so they should be required to attest to
the accuracy of their responses under penalty
of perjury. If the department discovers that a
firm provided misleading information, the firm
should be debarred for a substantial period of
time (e.g., five years), meaning that it would
be unable to bid on public contracts until the
debarment expired. Another justification for
debarment is to penalize continued non-compliance with OHS-related laws and regulations.
Just as prequalification ensures that worker
safety is taken into account at the front end of
the public bid process, state and local agencies
also need the authority to debar irresponsible
contractors from bidding on future contracts
based on chronic safety violations, either for a
fixed period of time or permanently (depending
on the severity of the violations).104
So far, responsible contractor programs have
focused almost exclusively on the construction
industry, but there are many other industries,
including health care and security, that con-
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tract with state and local agencies and whose
workers face serious job hazards. Advocates
may want to explore ways to implement similar
programs for these industries as well.
It may be useful to frame these contracting
policies as a responsible use of taxpayer dollars. Such a strategy might help to make the
idea more appealing to politically conservative
policymakers and the broader public, for whom
issues of worker safety may not resonate as
strongly.

Challenges
Trade associations fighting against prequalification programs say that rigorous prequalification
is impractical. They claim that general contractors will not have time to adequately screen
subcontractors and verify their safety records
during the hectic bidding process, since they
often have to accept sub-bids at the last minute.105 However, if the state maintains a standing
list of contractors and subcontractors that have
already been prequalified, then general contractors can quickly and easily select from that
list with confidence during the bidding process.
Massachusetts, for example, has successfully
implemented such a database.
The shortcomings of existing measures of employer safety also present a challenge. Because
there are too few OHS inspectors, and because
some employers fail to report on-the-job injuries, inspection records and official injury
reports may not reflect the actual incidence of
hazards or occupational injuries and illnesses.
Employers might also argue that these OHS
recordkeeping requirements were intended for
monitoring industry-wide trends and writing better rules, not for singling out firms for different
treatment based on their numbers.
Employers whose workers are represented by
a union or other labor organization may have
a reported injury-and-illness rate that is higher,
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or history of OHS inspections that is greater,
than non-union competitors. Workers with union
backing may not feel as discouraged from
reporting injuries and may be less likely to fear
retaliation for reporting OHS hazards or for
contacting a government agency for unresolved
OHS problems. For these reasons, unionized
firms may fear that too much emphasis on these
metrics will put them at a competitive disadvantage in the bidding process. Labor unions
might object as well because a firm’s inability to
secure contracts would result in fewer jobs for
their members.
A similar concern arises with workers’ compensation EMRs, because these reflect only the injuries for which workers file compensation claims.
Many employers pressure workers into not filing
claims for on-the-job injuries, and weighing
this factor heavily in contracting decisions could
result in employers increasing the pressure on
workers to not file compensation claims.
These concerns can be addressed by designing
a prequalification process that looks at a wide
range of factors, not just a firm’s reported injury
rates, EMRs, and inspection histories. These
metrics could be components of the evaluation,
but they would be balanced by more qualitative factors, including a firm’s written safety plan
and its programs for employee training and
participation.

Examples
Many states have prequalification programs in
place, although most do not address issues of
worker safety at all, instead focusing on companies’ financial health, bonding capacity, and
previous experience. The few programs that do
address worker safety take into account only a
limited set of factors, such as the firm’s EMR,
its history of citations, and its record of safety
meetings. Moreover, these programs—with the
exception of California’s—do not guarantee that
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the OHS factors will be consistently and meaningfully incorporated into the evaluation.
Public Citizen and the National Council for Occupational Safety and Health (National COSH)
have been urging state and local officials to

consider bidders’ safety records before awarding public contracts. Bills closely resembling the
model legislation described above have been
recently introduced in Maryland,106 North Carolina,107 and Tennessee.108

Innovative Contracting Policies at the Local Level
• Montgomery County, MD has developed a detailed set of terms and conditions that govern OHS in construction contracts, which it recently updated to require prequalification of
subcontractors as well.
(http://www6.montgomerycountymd.gov/apps/News/press/PR_details.asp?PrID=8703)
• Durham, NC requires bidders to answer detailed questions about their compliance records and safety plans.
(Appendix B, http://durhamnc.gov/ich/op/pwd/consproj/Documents/RainCatchers/All%20
Apendices.pdf)
• Fairfax County, VA evaluates bidders across a wide range of safety criteria, with false
submissions resulting in disqualification, debarment, or contract termination.
(http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/dpwes/construction/bids/constrsafety.pdf)
• The Los Angeles Unified School District uses a robust questionnaire that covers subjects
from training documentation to reporting of “close call” incidents. Contractors’ safety practices are also directly evaluated during the course of the work, and sometimes again upon
completion, to provide more information for future prequalification efforts.
(http://www.laschools.org/new-site/prequalification/forms)
• The New York City Council in 2013 introduced an ordinance that would require all contractors and subcontractors applying for financial assistance on city development projects
(1) to have apprenticeship programs, including safety training, and (2) to disclose any OHS
violations within the past 10 years, to be posted on the city’s website. (Int. No. 1169)
• The Oakland and Fremont, CA city councils passed resolutions in early 2014 that direct
their city managers to address wages, benefits, and OHS conditions at waste recycling
facilities when negotiating franchise agreements.
• The Austin, TX City Council adopted an ordinance in July 2010 that requires all construction projects with a city permit to provide workers a rest break of no less than 10 minutes
for every four hours worked.
(http://austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Contract_Management/Rest_Break_Ordinance_posters.pdf)
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Cross-Agency Partnerships: Working across
Government to Protect Workers
Problem
OHS agencies are denied the resources they
need to inspect all, or even a significant number, of the 9 million workplaces in the United
States. The AFL-CIO calculates that it would take
more than a century for these agencies to inspect every workplace at current funding levels.
Thus, Fed-OSHA and the state-plan agencies
rely on workers and their advocates to identify
dangerous working conditions. Each year, they
conduct tens of thousands of inspections based
on complaints from workers or their representatives and referrals from other agencies.
As described above, workers who can identify
conditions that violate OHS standards may file
a complaint and wait for an OHS inspector to
conduct an investigation, but many workers are
afraid to blow the whistle on unsafe working
conditions because they understandably fear
their employers will retaliate against them.
Officials from other government agencies who
observe potential OHS violations, by contrast,
need not fear employer backlash for reporting the dangerous conditions to OHS agency
officials. These referrals can be a valuable tool
for OHS agencies, providing another source of
reliable information about worksites that may
need improvements.

Solution
Various state and local government agencies could do a better
job of referring cases to FedOSHA and state-plan OHS agencies for investigation. Building inspectors, fire
marshals, and other agents who enforce local
codes often have legislatively granted powers to
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remove people from buildings or stop work at
construction sites when they observe conditions
that are particularly dangerous for workers or
members of the public. Although this authority arises out of the agencies’ power to enforce
building and fire codes, the linkages to OHS
concerns are often clear. In New York City, for
instance, the Department of Buildings (DOB) Environmental Control Board enforces local codes
dealing with excavation and demolition—hazardous jobs that are carried out increasingly by
immigrant and other vulnerable workers.
Workers’ advocates can capitalize on the stopwork powers of state and local inspectors by
campaigning to ensure that inspectors have a
strong understanding of how their codes overlap with OHS regulations. Advocates could
campaign for training programs that would
educate inspectors about the overlapping issues
and ensure that the inspectors submit referrals
to an OHS agency every time they issue a stopwork order or code violation that directly relates
to worker safety.
An important facet of this approach to strengthening OHS protections is that it can be accomplished without buy-in from a legislative
body, although legislative support would certainly strengthen the program. For instance,
advocates could consult with OHS experts who
could review state or local codes and develop
a “cross-walk” document that links provisions
of those codes to state or federal OSHA regulations. That document could be the centerpiece
of a campaign to connect various code enforcement agencies with OHS agency enforcement
staff. Importantly, many localities have adopted
consensus standards (e.g., National Fire Protection Association codes and standards) as their
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local codes, creating an opportunity for a multijurisdiction cross-walk document and outline for
OHS referral procedures.
Examples of major OHS hazards that might be
covered in both building codes and OHS regulations are: demolition, excavation and trench
digging, scaffolds, cranes, fire hazards, and
access to fire exits. When building inspectors
find code violations related to these hazards,
they should immediately submit a referral to the
state-plan OHS agency or local Fed-OSHA area
office.
Wage-and-hour officials whose primary job is
to ensure that workers are being paid fairly are
the other group of enforcement authorities who
may have the opportunity to ask workers if they
have observed conditions of concern at their
workplaces. As a practical matter, employers
who violate wage and hour laws are likely to
be the same ones that violate OHS regulations.
Cal/OSHA collaborates with state agencies that
enforce wage-and-hour laws, workers’ compensation requirements, contracting, licensing, and
other work-related programs.109 This California
Labor Enforcement Task Force investigates worker complaints and has developed an innovative
inspection-targeting program that combines
the agencies’ staff, knowledge, and authorities. A firm with health and safety problems that
might not rise to the level of “imminent danger”
required for a Cal/OSHA stop-work order might
nonetheless be ordered to shut down if sufficient wage-and-hour or workers’ compensation
violations are also uncovered by the task force
during a joint inspection.

Challenges
Major budgetary constraints and overworked
staff are problems in almost every government
agency. Proposals that would add OHS-related
responsibilities on top of code inspectors’ existing workloads may not garner sufficient support
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from code inspectors to be workable. Certainly
if OHS advocates go to the state legislature in
hopes of securing a legal mandate to develop
partnerships between code enforcers and OHS
agencies, a lack of support from the code
enforcers could doom the proposal. Workers’ advocates must develop the evidence that
improving linkages between stop-work authority
and OHS standards is a low-cost, high-impact
concept. On the cost side of the equation,
advocates can explain that the burden on code
inspectors would be as minimal and easy as
a phone call to the state-plan OHS agency or
local Fed-OSHA area office. Some referrals—
including unsafe excavations, rickety scaffolding, and blocked fire exits—are problems that
should obviously be referred to OHS agencies.
With improved education and training, some
less obvious hazardous conditions, such as
improperly stored chemicals or inadequate protection for employees working at heights, could
lead to referrals that will keep workers safe.
Workers’ advocates could further strengthen
their case by compiling statistics comparing the
number of building code inspections in a locality with the number of planned inspections by
the relevant OHS agency.110
The issue of preemption will inevitably arise
when advocates begin discussing how regula-
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tions other than those adopted by Fed-OSHA
might be used to protect workers in Fed-OSHA’s
jurisdiction. The recommendation laid out
above, though, is simply that government officials who enforce other laws and regulations
should refer more cases to Fed-OSHA when
violations of their regulations correspond to potential violations of OHS regulations. The other
officials’ laws and regulations are, by definition,
the laws of general applicability that are not
preempted by the OSH Act (see A Brief Explanation of Preemption, above).

Examples
New York City’s Department of Buildings (DOB)
is a prime example of a local code enforcement
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agency that issues stop-work orders for OHS-related violations. The department has numerous
code provisions that relate directly to workers’
health and safety, including requirements related to cranes, hoisting equipment, scaffolding,
demolition, and excavation. Many are simple
notice or permitting requirements that mandate, for instance, that firms obtain a permit
and notify neighbors before excavating below
certain depths. Stop-work orders can be issued
for failure to meet those obligations. Scofflaw
employers who neglect to follow these building
codes might very well take the same cavalier attitude towards OHS requirements, so it is critical
that building inspectors refer such cases to OHS
enforcement officials. 	 
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Annual State-Level Audits: Grading Agency
Performance
Problem
Workers in every state experience injuries, illnesses, and fatalities due to workplace hazards,
but without adequate information on what the
state-plan OHS agencies are doing or not doing
to address those problems, it will be difficult for
advocates to pinpoint exactly what changes these
agencies need to make to better protect workers.
Fed-OSHA evaluates the performance of the
state-plan OHS agencies in its Federal Annual
Monitoring and Evaluation (FAME) audits to determine whether they are “at least as effective” as
Fed-OSHA—the minimum legal standard that determines whether states can continue to run their
own OHS programs. The evaluations focus mainly
on a set of quantitative measures that states are
required to track, from average penalty amounts
to the promptness of agency activities.
Fed-OSHA’s reports, while valuable, cover only
certain aspects of agency performance. Advocates
will need more information about their state-plan
OHS agency’s practices in order to identify problems and pursue much-needed reforms.

Solution
Legislatures in state-plan jurisdictions should create a system for
conducting annual performance
audits of the state’s OHS agency.
A legislative oversight committee, for example, or
an independent commission with worker members could be the entity responsible for conducting these audits, preparing detailed reports, and
posting them online. The oversight body would
develop qualitative and quantitative measures to
evaluate the agency’s performance, prepare a
detailed report, and post it online. The oversight
body’s purpose would be broader than FedChapter 3: Strengthening Institutions

OSHA’s: Instead of simply determining whether
the state program meets the (fairly low) bar set
by Fed-OSHA, the committee would focus on
maximizing the program’s effectiveness, ideally to
a point that far surpasses the performance of FedOSHA and other states.
State-level audits could be useful in persuading
lawmakers and the public of the need for reforms,
including many of those suggested in this manual.
Also, once a state adopts any of these reforms, the
oversight body could be responsible for monitoring implementation.
The following are just a few examples of the topics
and metrics that could be examined by the oversight body:
• What are the mean and median number of
days or hours for the agency to respond to
complaints, fatalities, and imminent danger
situations?
• What are the average initial penalties and average “final” penalties for each citation category
(serious, willful, repeat, etc.)?
• What percentage of serious hazards is corrected
during the inspection?
• How effective is the agency’s outreach to industry about particular hazards (e.g., fall protection
on construction sites) in reducing the number of
fatalities and injuries related to the hazard?
• In what percentage of inspections do union
representatives participate with the OHS agency
staff?
• In what percentage of inspections do representatives from community-based organizations
participate with the OHS agency staff?
• What are the language abilities of the OHS
agency inspectors?
71

• Has the agency taken proactive steps to encourage second-language ability among its staff
(e.g., recruiting inspectors with second-language skills; paying for tuition, books, and time
off when workers take language classes)?
• What percentage of the agency’s citations are
overturned or have the penalty reduced on appeal?
• Is the agency adequately preserving its enforcement records and making enough information publicly available to enable workers and
advocates to monitor the agency’s progress and
identify areas for improvement?

Challenges
Lawmakers and agencies may object to the overlap between the state-level audits and Fed-OSHA’s
FAME evaluations, claiming that the state audit
would entail an unnecessary duplication of effort.
Advocates can point out that Fed-OSHA’s evaluation criteria set a low bar for performance. State
officials should want their program to be more
effective than Fed-OSHA.
State-plan OHS agency staff may be concerned
that the metrics are unfair because they don’t take
into consideration their inadequate funding. Advocates can respond by indicating that the oversight
body’s report has the potential to provide evidence that the agency needs additional resources.
A major source of tension in designing an audit
plan will be developing the evaluation metrics.
Some groups are likely to prefer outcome-based
measures, designed to reflect the impact of agency
performance on workplace safety (e.g., injury and
fatality rates). Others may prefer activity-based
measures, which focus on the agency’s practices
and procedures (e.g., the number of inspections conducted). Both types have strengths and
weaknesses, and advocates could argue for a
combination of both. Also, audits should consider
quantitative measures (e.g., the percentage of
inspections with violations), as well as qualitative
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measures (e.g., interviews with workers or their
representatives on the agency’s effectiveness) to
obtain a more comprehensive picture of agency
performance.
State-plan OHS agencies may feel that activitybased metrics invite too much scrutiny of specific
agency practices, leading to micromanagement
by the oversight committee and depriving the
agency of flexibility and discretion in how it operates its program.111 And employers are likely to be
wary of any audit program that might influence
agencies to step up their enforcement practices.
Advocates should also be aware of any unintended consequences that may result from agencies
attempting to satisfy the audit measures. For example, if an agency is judged only on the number
of inspections performed, it might begin to conduct a greater number of relatively simple “safety”
inspections while neglecting to conduct more
complex “health” inspections. To avoid these kinds
of unintended consequences, advocates could
emphasize the need for an independent body with
worker representation that would be responsible
for developing the auditing program.

Examples
State legislative audits of agency performance
are common, and indeed, many state legislatures
have offices that specialize in conducting these
audits on behalf of standing oversight committees.
In Maryland, for example, the Office of Legislative
Audits (located within the Department of Legislative Services) undertakes performance audits of
state agencies at the request of the legislature’s
Joint Audit Committee. On some occasions, the
legislature may even request outside watchdog
groups or research organizations to conduct an
audit.112
Fed-OSHA’s FAME reports offer a good starting
point for what these audits could look like, but as
suggested above, advocates should encourage a
much broader investigation into agency performance.113
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Conclusion

A

ctivists, organizers, and other workers’ advocates operating at the state
and local level will usher in the next
generation of OHS policies. Because of
resistance in Washington to worker protections, forward-looking Members of Congress and progressive officials at Fed-OSHA
often get mired in political fights when they
seek to enact changes to federal OHS laws
and policies so as to better protect workers.
Their counterparts in state legislatures, city
councils, and state-plan OHS agencies also
face opposition from moneyed interests, but

Conclusion

grassroots organizing and a closer connection between workers and elected officials
can lead to more victories and improved
worker protections. This manual proposes
a broad array of changes to law and policy
in an effort to give workers and their advocates in every locality a starting point for
discussing new campaign ideas. By collecting these ideas and presenting them to
advocates around the nation, we hope to
have achieved a modest first step toward big
improvements in workers’ health and safety.
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Appendix: Overview of the OSH
Act and Workers’ Compensation
Fed-OSHA and the OSH Act
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH
Act) is a federal law enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1970. It established a new federal
agency—the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), within the U.S. Department of Labor—to develop and enforce occupational health and safety standards. The agency
is charged with developing and enforcing a
variety of workplace safety standards.
The law also established a process whereby
states could petition Fed-OSHA to recognize a
state agency as an effective replacement for the
federal program in that state. Upon recognition
and after a period of “concurrent jurisdiction”
meant to ensure a smooth transition, the “stateplan” agency has full authority to establish and
enforce occupational health and safety standards. Fed-OSHA does not extend OSH Act
protections to public-sector employees (e.g.,
police, firefighters, teachers, etc.), but approved
state-plan agencies do. Twenty-one states and
Puerto Rico have gone through this process and
established “state-plan” agencies that establish
and enforce standards within their jurisdictions.
Four other states and the U.S. Virgin Islands
have obtained Fed-OSHA’s approval to operate
partial state plans that cover only public-sector
workers (Fed-OSHA retains jurisdiction over
private-sector workplaces).
Fed-OSHA has its headquarters in Washington,
D.C., but most inspection work is conducted
out of area offices at the state and local levels.
Inspections are initiated for a variety of reasons. Many are prompted by a complaint from
a worker, a reported fatality or injury, or even
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an inspector noticing something amiss while
driving down the road. Sometimes other government agencies refer cases to Fed-OSHA.
Roughly 60 percent of OSHA inspections are
scheduled through its system for randomly
selecting worksites and its industry- or hazardspecific “emphasis programs.” State-plan states
operate in a similar fashion, although their
emphasis programs often target industries that
present unique challenges in their geographical
jurisdictions.
The OSH Act also established the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
When an employer challenges a citation issued
by Fed-OSHA, the case is litigated before an
administrative law judge and can be appealed
to the Review Commission. The Review Commission’s decisions are reviewable in federal
appellate court. State plans also give employers
an opportunity to challenge citations through
an administrative process and ultimately appeal the decision in a court, although the exact
procedures vary from state to state.

Workers’ Compensation
In every state but Texas, employers are required
to carry workers’ compensation insurance that
will pay medical expenses for employees injured or made ill on the job and replace income
for those who are out of work recovering for
extended periods of time. States have different
laws spelling out which employers must have
coverage. Texas does not require any employers to have workers’ compensation coverage,
while California requires anyone with at least
one employee to have the insurance. In many
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states, smaller employers or employers in certain industries, such as agriculture, are exempt
from this requirement. If injured workers miss a
certain number of consecutive work days—three
days in many states, seven in others—they are
entitled to receive payments equal to a portion
of their wages for the time they are unable to
work.
Ideally, the workers’ compensation system
encourages prevention by offering lower premiums to employers who keep their workplaces
healthy and safe. The system should also ensure
that workers who are injured at work or who
suffer job-related illnesses get prompt care that
allows them to recover and return to work, and
that those who must miss several days of work—
or, in the worst cases, cannot work again—receive prompt cash payments and avoid severe
financial hardship.
In many cases, however, the system simply does
not work as it should to encourage prevention
and give prompt assistance to injured and ill
workers. Some employers who are required to
have insurance may avoid purchasing it or lie
about what kind of workers they employ. Some
keep their workers’ compensation premiums
low by pressuring workers not to file workers’
compensation claims, or by fighting the claims
in administrative proceedings. Insurers generally
also argue that occupational diseases cannot
be proven to have stemmed from a particular
workplace exposure, so workers with occupational illnesses receive compensation much too

rarely. Adjudication of workers’ compensation
claims can be a lengthy process, and in some
cases workers face long delays before getting
the medical care or cash benefits they desperately need, and to which they are entitled.
Many workers have reported feeling helpless
and harassed when they tried to secure compensation, and stories of these difficulties can
discourage other workers from filing compensation claims. As a result, workers’ families,
private health insurers, and public programs
like Medicaid and Social Security end up bearing costs that should have been covered by the
workers’ compensation system.
Some states are working to improve their workers’ compensation systems, but sometimes
efforts for “reform” are aimed at reducing
employers’ costs without improving prevention
or compensation for workers. In recent years,
advocates have come together to fight efforts
to decrease maximum dollar amounts or time
limits for workers’ compensation benefits.
To learn more, visit the nonprofit website Workers’ Comp Hub, (http://workerscomphub.org),
a project of the National Council on Occupational Safety & Health (National COSH) and
the National Economic & Social Rights Initiative
(NESRI). The site offers resources on the workers’ compensation system in general, as well
as specifics for programs in various states; for
instance, Pennsylvania workers can download
PhilaPOSH’s Injured on the Job handbook.114
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